Great-Power conflict between the Ottomans and the Safavids dominated the fate of the Middle East and to a lesser but still sizeable degree of the Caucasus throughout the 16th century. The rivalry was both a geo-strategic and an ideological confessional one. The Ottomans under Ḳânûnî Sulṭân Süleymân conducted several campaigns against the Safavid neighbor with the ultimate aim to adding parts of Iran to their realm. There was a clear hope on the Ottoman side that they could exploit inter-tribal rivalry among the Ḳızılbaş and the ambitions of Safavid princes for their aims. The Ottomans had a reason to hope so, when in 1546/47 a brother of the shah, Alḳâs Mîrzâ revolted in Shirvan and defected to their side. Yet during the ensuing campaign of 1548/49 they failed to install Alḳâs Mîrzâ as a puppet ruler over Iran. On the contrary using the tactic of scorched earth, Shah Ṭahmâsb succeeded in driving out the Ottomans and to devastate wide parts of Eastern Anatolia. The expected Ottoman counter-attack did not aim against the bulk of the Safavid Army but was directed against the Georgian princes. With the painful loss of Van being the sole exception the Safavids managed to strengthen their position throughout the Iranian-Ottoman borderland. Ṭahmâsb’s military talent and expertise aside it was the fact that the Ḳızılbaş tribes of Iran – which one has sharply to distinguish from the shah’s Anatolian followers – did keep their cohesion. This cohesion was possible thanks to two facts: first Ṭahmâsb was a master in exploiting inner-tribal and inter-tribal dynamics, and secondly the fact that the Safavids had some kind of “ideology” at their disposal, namely the veneration of the shah as a murşid-i kâmil.