Preface

The theory of exclusion (Apohavāda) has long been an object of fascination for philosophers and Indologists despite – perhaps even because of – lack of access to the most important sources for understanding it.[1] This is not the only time in the field of Indian philosophy when inadequate knowledge of the primary sources has bestowed an aura of mystery upon an, in principle, readily intelligible idea. The first translation of one of the early defining statements of the theory was Frauwallner's German translation of the verses of the Apoha Section of *Pramāṇavārttika* 1 (PV[SV] 1.40–185), based on the Tibetan version, together with a summary of the autocommentary.[2] Although this translation represents a pioneering achievement and holds up well even today as an international team of scholars translates PV(SV) 1.40–185 directly from the Sanskrit,[3] the fact that it is in German has limited its impact. Frauwallner also published a translation of Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa* shortly after his translation of the Apoha Section of PV 1 (Frauwallner 1937), but this too was in German.[4] In 1937 Gaṅgānātha Jhā's English translation of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* appeared. The *Śabdārthaparīkṣā* chapter of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* contains a comprehensive defence of the Apohavāda against Brahmin criticisms, in particular those of Kumārila; sixty-seven verses of Kumārila, probably taken from his *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, are quoted. This publication gave English-speaking scholars full access to the Apohavāda for the first time, though in a more developed form.[5]

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[1] Influential early philosophical treatments of *apoha* include Herzberger 1975, Shaw 1978, Siderits 1982, 1985, 1991: 87–110, 1999, and Ganeri 2001: 106–114.

[2] Frauwallner 1932, 1933, 1935.

[3] Using Gnoli's edition, which came out in 1960. The first part of this three-part project appeared in November, 2018. See Eltschinger et al. 2018.

[4] See Kataoka 2014b for an updated treatment of Dharmottara on *apoha* with a critical assessment of Frauwallner's view of Dharmottara.

[5] Mark Siderits' early studies of *apoha* (1982, 1985, 1991: 87–110, and 1999),

Meanwhile, the foundational statement of the theory, the fifth chapter of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS 5), remained in obscurity. Without a clear grasp of what Dignāga was proposing, Dharmakīrti's revision and defense of the Apohavāda in his *Pramāṇavārttika*, despite the crucial materials made available by Frauwallner, were difficult to understand and assess. Frauwallner's explanation of the central role played by the Apohavāda in Dignāga's philosophy in his seminal article "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung"[6] was of considerable help, but it also made scholars even more aware of the need for a translation and study of PS 5 itself. Kumārila's criticism of Dignāga's theory in his *Ślokavārttika*, as well as Uddyotakara's treatment of it in his *Nyāyavārttika* (ad NBh 2.2.66), both of which were already available in English translation in 1907 and 1919, respectively,[7] are highly polemical in tone and do not allow one to gain a clear picture of Dignāga's views in all their subtlety and complexity.[8] Richard Hayes's English translation of substantial portions of the second and fifth chapters of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Hayes 1988), therefore, was a major step forward, in fact, another groundbreaking achievement. Yet, based principally on the poor-quality Tibetan translations of Dignāga's text and reliant also upon the Tibetan version of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary,[9] it still left many things in the dark. As Hayes himself confesses,

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which did much to stimulate the interest of Anglophone philosophers, are primarily based on the *Tattvasaṅgraha*. It should be noted, however, that when quoting the TS and Kamalaśīla's commentary he provides his own translations. Siderits 1991: 87–102, moreover, tackles Dharmakīrti's discussion in PV 1. This is an important contribution because it shows that Dharmakīrti upheld a sense-reference distinction in PV 1.40ff., which most scholars now accept. Siderits 1999 also references the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Siderits revisits his earlier work in Siderits 2011.

[6] Frauwallner 1959: 98–106.

[7] Jhā 1907, 1984.

[8] Mookerjee 1935 discusses various theories of *apoha* and their historical development based on the primary sources available at the time, i.e., the works of Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita, Jayanta, Vācaspatimiśra, and Ratnakīrti. His interpretations were later critically reexamined by Akamatsu 1971.

[9] Though also critically consulting the translations of passages of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5 into Sanskrit from Vasudhararakṣita's Tibetan translations

"trying to piece together [Dignāga's] original thought on the basis of the Tibetan translations is like looking at a human skull and trying to imagine what the person's face looked like when alive."[10]

It was not until quite recently, more than seventy years after Frauwallner's initial contributions, with the work of Ole Holten Pind, that Dignāga's Apohavāda has finally come clearly into view. In his 2009 dissertation, published in a corrected and reorganized format in 2015 in this same series (Pind 2015), he restored most of the Sanskrit text of PS 5 together with its *Vṛtti*, using a newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. Accompanying his new English translation, based on this restored text, with extensive annotations that provide the technical linguistic and philosophical background of Dignāga's arguments (some forming appendices in the *Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens* edition), along with detailed discussions of text-critical issues, he was able for the first time to enable the reader willing to work through all the materials he had assembled to get a definite idea of what Dignāga is up to: what, at each stage of the treatise, he is rejecting, what he is proposing, and how he is defending his own position. Although more work remains to be done – refinements of Pind's translations and interpretations will become possible when the critical edition of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the fifth chapter is completed[11] – it is as it stands a seminal work of scholarship that will undoubtedly revolutionize the field of *apoha* studies.[12]

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by Muni Jambūvijayajī in footnotes to the second part (eighth *ara*) of NĀA, as well as citations of PS 5 in other Sanskrit sources.

[10] Hayes 1988: 230.

[11] Currently being undertaken by Birgit Kellner, Horst Lasic, and Patrick McAllister of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

[12] Valuable studies of the Apohavāda that appeared in the latter decades of the twentieth century, bridging the gap, so to speak, between the work of Frauwallner and Pind, were carrried out by Japanese scholars: Akamatsu 1971, Katsura 1979 and 1991, and Hattori 1977 and 1980. Hattori 2000, meanwhile, is an English translation of the initial verses of PS 5, while Hattori 1973 and 1975 are a Japanese

It is principally Pind's achievement that has made it possible for us to offer a new, annotated translation of the *Apohavāda* chapter of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV *Apohavāda*). Understanding better the theory Kumārila is criticizing, one is better able to understand his criticisms. At the same time, Kumārila's criticisms in many cases clarify Dignāga's arguments in turn. We hope that our translation, accompanied by Pind's translation of PS 5, by providing direct access to the materials that represent the earliest stage of the debate about *apoha* – which comprise the earliest version of the theory itself and the first comprehensive response to it – will put future interpretations and discussions of the Apohavāda on a firmer footing.

Equally essential for a new translation of ŚV *Apohavāda*, however, was a new, critical edition of the text. This was carried out by Kataoka at the beginning of the project using six manuscripts along with some of the existing editions; it is presented here as the first part of this volume. Also essential for our work was an edition of Sucaritamiśra's important commentary on the *Apohavāda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*.[13] This was also prepared and published by Kataoka in three parts.[14] Finally, a critical edition of the *apoha* section of Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*, executed again by Kataoka (Kataoka 2017), contributed to a broader understanding of Kumārila's position in its historical context.[15]

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translation of ŚV *Apohavāda*. Hattori 1982 is a critical edition of the Tibetan version of PS 5 together with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. For a useful survey of early scholarship on Dignāga and *apoha*, including Japanese contributions, see Hayes 1988: 9–32.

[13] The Trivandrum Sanskrit Series edition of Sucarita's *Kāśikā* extends only through the *Sambandhākṣepa* chapter.

[14] Kataoka 2014a covers Sucarita's extensive commentary on ŚV *Apohavāda* 1; it also describes the manuscripts used and discusses Sucarita's philosophical and chronological relation to other authors. Kataoka 2015 covers vv. 2–94 and Kataoka 2019 vv. 95–176.

[15] See also Watson and Kataoka 2017 for a translation of Jayanta's arguments on *apoha*. Other studies in the same volume (McAllister 2017), e.g., by Pascale Hugon ("On *vyāvṛtta*"), Hideyo Ogawa ("The Qualifier-Qualificand Relation and Coreferentiality"), Kei Kataoka ("Dharmottara's Notion of *āropita*"), and McAllister ("Competing Theories of Conceptual Cognition"), expand the discussion.

This project was originally conceived in 2009 as part of a larger undertaking proposed by Dr. Helmut Krasser, Director of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA) in Vienna. When funding for the larger venture did not materialize, Kataoka and Taber decided to go ahead independently. If we had chosen a chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* to translate together for ourselves, we probably would have selected a different one; both of us had avoided the topic of *apoha* up to that point in our research, daunted by its difficulty. But encouraged by Krasser we recognized the need for a translation of ŚV *Apohavāda*; moreover, it would complement other work being done on *apoha* at the IKGA. Finally, each of us had previously translated other chapters of the *Ślokavārttika* (Taber 2005, Kataoka 2011a) according to somewhat different interests and methodologies. We were curious to see what the result would be if we joined forces. We met to work on the translation in August–September, 2012, in Albuquerque, New Mexico; December–January, 2013–14, in Fukuoka, Japan; and December–January, 2014–15, again in Albuquerque. Kataoka's travel was supported by JSPS KAKENHI (the Scientific Research Fund of the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science, grants no. 23520067 and 15K02043), Taber's by his annual travel allotment from the Department of Philosophy of the University of New Mexico. We wish to express our sincere thanks to both of these institutions. Overall, our collaboration has been very rewarding – and this, despite the fact that there are still certain questions concerning Kumārila and Dharmakīrti about which we disagree. By combining our expertise, we feel that we have produced a translation that is better than either of us could have achieved on his own.

We also would like to express our gratitude to Birgit Kellner and Patrick McAllister of the IKGA for carefully vetting the manuscript before we submitted it to the Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften for consideration for publication. They made numerous suggestions for improvement, almost all of which we followed. The anonymous reviewers for the Verlag also offered constructive criticisms that led to significant revisions, as did our copy editor, Prof. John Bussanich. Finally, we are deeply appreciative of the IKGA for covering the subvention costs for the publication of this work.

Our main goal in translating ŚV *Apohavāda* has been to figure out what Kumārila is saying and communicate our understanding of it. Our guiding principle has been only to translate a verse, relying on all the resources at our disposal, when we were confident that we fully understood the argument being made. We present our notion of what the text means in relatively short, minimally technical explanations following individual verses or groups of verses. By "resources at our disposal" we mean, besides the existing editions and manuscripts, principally the classical Mīmāṃsā commentaries on the ŚV *Apohavāda*, i.e., those of Jayamiśra (date unknown), Sucaritamiśra (first half of the tenth century), and Pārthasārathimiśra (twelfth century),[16] along with Kamalaśīla's commentary on the verses of Kumārila cited by Śāntarakṣita in the *Śabdārthaparīkṣā* chapter of his *Tattvasaṅgraha*. Although the last was always consulted, we cite it less frequently in the footnotes, when it included information not already found in the Mīmāṃsā commentaries or was helpful in deciding between interpretations of a verse or provided a noteworthy alternative. Of course, PS 5 came into play, too, when identifying the arguments of Dignāga Kumārila is attacking. Having studied and digested these materials, we usually followed what we felt to be the most plausible construal of Kumārila's statement – in the majority of cases, of course, the commentators agree. In the footnotes we discuss some, but by no means all, of the more interesting differences of interpretation and justify our selection. "Our understanding" as expressed in the explanations, thus, to a great extent, represents a processing of the traditional exegesis of Kumārila's text.

We hope that this translation will not just be of interest to specialists of Indian philosophy, though we have not tried to make it into a popular introduction to the Indian debate about the Apohavāda or, more broadly, Indian semantics. The main hurdle to overcome in gaining access to this text is not the theory of *apoha* itself, which is really not that difficult, we think – once one understands it! It is, rather, the complexity of the debate, which relates to so many topics in Indian linguistics, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. We provide much of this context in the notes. We have, however, exercized restraint in doing so, offering only as much

[16] See Kataoka 2014a: 360(3).

background and philological analysis as we feel is necessary to meet the requirements of a scientific annotated translation, without, it is hoped, completely overwhelming the reader. Hence, we do invite non-specialists interested in acquiring a deeper knowledge of Indian philosophy to attempt to penetrate this challenging material. (Even specialists will not find it easy going!) Those who are altogether unacquainted with the Apohavāda may learn the basics by reading the lucid and still essentially accurate account in Kunjunni Raja 1963: 78–94, which references Uddyotakara and Kumārila among other authors, or else by reading Chakrabarti and Siderits's introduction to the volume they recently edited together with Tom Tillemans: *Apoha*: *Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition* (2011). Indian philosophy cannot, any more than Western philosophy, be summarized in a list of results. It has a distinctive methodology (or, indeed, methodologies), characterized by unique ways of developing and critiquing ideas, not to mention its own set of presuppositions. To really begin to plumb its depths one must learn, or at least get a feel for, this methodology. Here, in ŚV *Apohavāda*, we encounter one of the greatest Indian philosophers hard at work on a rather technical problem, putting the machinery of Indian philosophical analysis through its paces, so to speak. At the same time, this problem was at the heart of so many controversies concerning metaphysical and epistemological questions in classical Indian philosophy.

The translation is followed by essays by each of the co-authors. Taber's locates Kumārila's contribution to the debate about *apoha* in relation to his predecessors Dignāga and the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara – one of the first Brahmin philosophers to react to Dignāga's proposal – and Kumārila's successor (or, possibly, younger contemporary), the great Dharmakīrti. It attempts to convey an idea of the significance of Kumārila's achievement in ŚV *Apohavāda* – for instance, although Kumārila was clearly influenced by Uddyotakara, he went well beyond him – while also giving an overview of the problems Brahmin authors thought they saw in the theory and how Dharmakīrti, at least, addressed them. (Dharmakīrti's defense, however, in its main outlines, was upheld by his successors.) Kataoka's essay carefully analyzes Kumārila's refutation of the Apohavāda with a view to assessing how successful it is. For instance, many modern scholars, not to mention Brahmin critics of the Apohavāda after

Kumārila, believe that Kumārila's famous Circularity (or mutual presupposition) Argument (anticipated by Uddyotakara) – that the exclusion of non-cow, which is allegedly the meaning of the word "cow," already presupposes the notion of a cow and vice versa; hence, one can never acquire either concept – amounts to a decisive refutation of the theory. Kataoka shows that this argument, in particular, turns on a failure to appreciate subtleties of Dignāga's presentation, and similarly for other arguments of Kumārila. His discussion, thus, at the same time bolsters Dignāga's position. Together these essays provide a thematic introduction to ŚV *Apohavāda*. They may even be read before tackling the annotated translation, or in conjunction with it. The third part of Taber's essay ("Kumārila") contains a sufficiently detailed summary of the contents of ŚV *Apohavāda* to serve as a synopsis, while Kataoka's essay includes an analysis of ŚV *Apohavāda* 1–114 (Section 6, pp. 226–232). For these reasons, our annotated translation is not preceded by a separate introductory synopsis, as is found in other translations of Sanskrit philosophical texts. The edition, however, is accompanied by an outline in Sanskrit.

Although there exists today a considerable body of scholarly literature on the topic of *apoha*, we have not felt it necessary, or desirable, to reference it at every point where our findings imply agreement or disagreement with the work of others. The main purpose of this translation, as already explained, is to provide a new resource for the study of *apoha*. We believe it would detract from it were we, at every opportuity, to go into the ways in which a more precise understanding of Kumārila calls for the modification of existing interpretations. Moreover, we feel that much of what has been written about *apoha* concerns less the actual theories of Indian authors than reconstructions of them by inventive modern scholars.[17] What is needed at this point is not further discussion of these

[17] See, for instance, Dreyfus 2011: 208–209: "In dealing with Dharmakīrti's views, I try to remain as close as possible to his own formulations. I believe that it

reconstructions but a renewed attempt to understand the original sources. Let us return to the texts![18]

Nevertheless, it would be remiss of us not to indicate at least briefly what we think some of the consequences a deeper knowledge of Kumārila's treatment of *apoha* will have for the field of *apoha* studies. We shall, therefore, venture tentatively into this literature – not too far, lest we are unable to find our way back! – in the hope of piqueing the interest of other scholars in what we have done and encouraging them to make the effort, even if they are not Sanskritists, to work through our translation. Our apologies to the non-specialist reader for a somewhat technical discussion; at this point he or she may wish to move on to the translation or the essays.

One of the most influential proposals regarding the interpretation of the Apohavāda to have been put forward recently is Tom Tillemans's suggestion that there is a distinction to be made between "top-down" and "bottom-up" theories of *apoha*. Tillemans presents this idea in his article, "How to Talk About Ineffable Things," which is included in the anthology previously mentioned, *Apoha*: *Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cogni-*

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is problematic to deal with the apoha theory in abstraction from any historical location. Nevertheless, historical precision has its limits, especially when dealing with the philosophical reconstruction of a theory, as is the case here. Thus, it should be clear that in dealing with Dharmakīrti's views, I do not try to capture the ways in which Dharmakīrti understood his work as a commentary on and a defense of Dignāga's apoha theory. Rather, I attempt a philosophical reconstruction of his theory, presenting it as a viable attempt to defend the nominalist project of showing how thought and language can be accounted for in a world of particulars." See also Patil 2011: 150: "What I want to do in this paper is try to develop a generic interpretation of the theory of exclusion that is based on the work of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, and then use it to raise questions that *a contemporary exclusion theorist* should, but may not, have very good answers for" (our italics). See, finally, Siderits 1982: 195, which may have started this reconstruction trend: "What I propose to do is offer an attempt at a rational reconstruction of some key elements of the doctrine of *apoha*, basing this reconstruction on the view sketched above of the underlying methodology of the school."

[18] In urging this we join a movement that is already underway. Several translations of important materials relating to *apoha* in addition to Pind 2015 have recently appeared: McCrea/Patil 2010, Watson/Kataoka 2017, McAllister 2019.

tion.[19] Several other distinguished contributors to that volume embrace and elaborate this dichotomy, so that it appears to have solidified itself as an interpretive paradigm.[20] Now, the scholars who endorse it seem to understand it in slightly different ways. Let us engage Tillemans's initial formulation:

> By "top-down" I mean a position that would somehow maintain that it is because of some specific – and perhaps even very ingenious – features of the logical operators of negation in the exclusion that the apoha does pertain to particular things, even though it does not have the ontological baggage of a real universal. In short, on a top-down approach the apoha would behave like a property, a sense, or a meaning, which belongs to the conceptual scheme but nonetheless qualifies and thus serves to pick out the real particulars of the world; because of some feature of double negation, we are spared commitment to real universals in addition to real particulars. On a bottom-up approach, causal chains and error are what serve to bridge the scheme-content gap, rather than the logico-metaphysical feature of a special sort of double negation. The way words link to things is thus primarily explained through the existence of a causal chain from things to thoughts and then to the utterances of words.[21]

Both of these "approaches" are intended as ways of "bridging the scheme-content gap," according to Tillemans. "Scheme" refers to conceptual scheme, "content" to experience. Thus, the Apohavāda, in either of its versions, is according to Tillemans an attempt to explain how meanings and concepts relate to real things – which for Buddhists are unique particulars – or how thought and language are anchored in non-conceptual, non-linguistic reality.

Tillemans traces this problem back to the controversy in ancient Indian grammatical literature about whether a word expresses an individual or a general property (Tillemans 2011: 52). The word "cow" in some contexts clearly refers to a class of individuals, all cows, e.g., in the sentence, "One

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[19] Tillemans 2011a.

[20] Dreyfus 2011: 221; Ganeri 2011: 243–244; Siderits 2011: passim.

[21] Tillemans 2011a: 53. Cf. Chakrabarti and Siderits 2011: 27–28.

should not kill a cow." Yet when someone says, "Bring the cow," it is just one particular cow that is indicated. The Nyāya tradition solved this problem by proposing that general terms – i.e., class terms like "cow," property terms like "brown," and motion terms like "is walking" – refer to both an individual and a "genus" (*jāti*) at the same time, with one of its meanings becoming primary, the other secondary depending on the context. The Mīmāṃsā tradition proposed that words directly indicate only "universals" (*ākṛti* or *sāmānya*), which in turn *imply* individuals in which they inhere, which individuals themselves therefore are not actually designated by words.

But the scheme-content problem, which originated in analytic philosophy with the work of W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson, is actually slightly different from this one. It is, rather, the problem of *how* experiences of individuals can give rise to meanings and concepts that refer to them; more specifically, how are these meanings and concepts connected with the perceptual experiences of individuals through which we encounter the world first-hand? Obviously, we are able to use words to pick out individuals. How do we arrive at such an ability, given that individuals themselves are *prima facie* distinct from each other, even unique, and our perceptual experiences grasp them *individually*, as unrelated to other things? Dignāga sought to work out a "top-down" solution to this problem, Tillemans suggests, while Dharmakīrti explored a "bottom-up" one.

Now, it is easy to see how one might think that Dharmakīrti was attempting to provide a bottom-up solution; indeed, some of the essays in the volume in question give plausible and quite interesting interpretations of what he says about *apoha* from that point of view.[22] However, if one has a precise understanding of the *Apohavāda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*, it will appear that he is doing something rather different. Namely, it will seem that he is developing a point-by-point response to Kumārila's critique of Dignāga's version of the Apohavāda. Since Taber's essay at the end of this monograph is in part devoted to showing this, it will not be necessary to go into detail here. But in his most extensive treatement of *apoha*, what can be called the Apoha Section of the first chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika*

[22] Though they are also rather different in their details. See Tillemans 2011a: 54–58; Dreyfus 2011: 215–221; Siderits 2011: 286–294.

(PV[SV] 1.40–185), Dharmakīrti solves many of the problems with the Apohavāda to which Kumārila draws attention in the *Apohavāda* chapter of his *Ślokavārttika*, often by adjusting and revising the theory. To be sure, he does not mention Kumārila by name – it was his practice not to identify his opponents – and it is not always immediately obvious how a certain idea he is developing addresses an objection raised by Kumārila. But when the arguments and overall plan of the Apohavāda Section finally come into view (this does not happen immediately, as those who have grappled with the text well know), it impresses one as a brilliant, comprehensive, systematic response to Kumārila's critique.

Now, one of Kumārila's most striking criticisms of the Apohavāda in his *Apohavāda* chapter – which, once again, is directed against Dignāga's version of the theory – is that, if the meanings of words were *apoha*s, then one would not be able to learn what words mean. For *apoha*s are not perceptible; certainly, Dignāga does not say that they are. Moreover, they are not real entities (*vastu*) but merely absences (*abhāva*), which are not objects of perception either for Buddhists or Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila. In fact, the Buddhist position, as construed by Kumārila, is that we become aware of *apoha*s through language and inference. If *apoha*s, however, are not accessible independently of language or inference, then one would never be able to establish a connection between an *apoha* and a certain word or inferential mark (*liṅga*), so that the latter could be used to designate or indicate it. The defender of the Apohavāda, therefore, must explain how we become aware of *apoha*s in the first place, independently of language and inference, so that we are able to learn that words and inferential marks refer to them. The Mīmāṃsaka, by the way, had a ready solution to this problem. Meanings and referents of inferential marks are universals, and universals for him are *directly perceptible*. When we perceive a cow, we apprehend cowness as well as the individual cow. Although the relation between word and meaning is eternal, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, children are able to learn the meanings of words by observing the linguistic practice of their elders, which reveals that certain words have the capacity (*śakti*) to designate certain universals and, vice versa, certain universals have the capacity to be designated by certain words.

It is indeed this problem – how are *apoha*s cognized independently of the words and concepts that refer to them, so that connections between

*apoha*s and those words and concepts can be established? – that Dharmakīrti seems to be attempting to solve by explaining how perceptual experiences of particulars can give rise to general concepts, which are *apoha*s (i.e., shared *differences* from other kinds of things), which are then erroneously projected on those particulars as their properties.[23] Again, there is no need to go into detail; several essays in *Apoha*: *Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition* do an admirable job of telling the rather complicated (or convoluted?) story.[24] We would stress, however, more than other scholars have done, that the psychological process Dharmakīrti traces yields a cognitive structure, which he sometimes identifies as the "appearance" (*pratibhāsa*) of a conceptual cognition, that is suitable to being assigned as the meaning of a word.[25] In answer to the problem raised by Kumārila, then, we learn what words mean by learning conventions that relate words to general concepts (*apoha*s) formed spontaneously from the experiences of particulars (and erroneously superimposed on them as real properties). That is to say, we become aware of meanings independently of language and inference solely *via* the perception of *particulars*, not universals!

This is just *one* line of defense of the Apohavāda Dharmakīrti develops in the Apoha Section of PV 1. To be sure, it is a theory that immediately *lends itself* to being applied as a solution to the scheme-content problem. The explanation of how we become aware of meanings (*apoha*s) as a result of perceptions of particulars certainly *implies* how thought and language are anchored in non-linguistic, non-conceptual reality. Yet that was not the challenge Dharmakīrti confronted; his challenge, rather, was to save the Apohavāda. He develops several other lines of defense of the Apohavāda in the Apoha Section, including but not limited to his answer to the

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[23] In general, we reject Dreyfus's statement, Dreyfus 1997: 515, n. 32, "The question of how language is acquired is not addressed by Buddhist epistemologists." It will be evident below that Dignāga, too, was very much concerned with how the meanings of words are learned.

[24] See especially Dunne 2011: 90–102, Tillemans 2011a: 55–56, and Dreyfus 2011: 212–215.

[25] See, e.g., PVSV 38,17–24 (cf. Eltschinger et al. 2018: 76–77); 47,14–48,17; 49,16–23; 57,8–58,18.

Circularity Argument against the Apohavāda that other scholars have noted. In short, the section amounts to an impressive, comprehensive defence of the Apohavāda by way of a thorough revision of Dignāga's theory in order to correct real flaws in it that others had drawn attention to. This comprehensive defense of the Apohavāda, moreover, is embedded in an even more expansive critique of realist metaphysical and epistemological theories, i.e., those of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Mīmāṃsā, but especially the latter: the existence of real universals, the distinction between property-bearer and property and the possession by a property-bearer of multiple properties, the authorlessness of the Veda, the existence of permanent entities (such as the Veda and the self), and certain logical principles (or mistakes) that were employed in arguments in support of these teachings. Indeed, when one takes in the entire first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* it appears as less an investigation of *svārthānumāna*, "inference for oneself," the topic of the second chapter of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, which it was traditionally seen as a commentary on, than a vast, meandering polemic against the metaphysical and logico-epistemological foundations of Mīmāṃsā.

Thus, it is somewhat misleading to suggest that Dharmakīrti, in his discussion of *apoha*, is engaged in crafting a bottom-up solution to the scheme-content problem, even if *part* of what he is doing can be seen, by someone trained in twentieth-century analytic philosophy, to be related to the scheme-content problem. Is this really such a big deal, then? Can't one legitimately use Dharmakīrti's writings to *construct* a solution to the scheme-content problem if one wants to, despite the fact that that was not his intention? To this, the following needs to be said. Normally, when appropriating the ideas of another author for other purposes, one not only acknowledges their source but also explains how one is employing them differently from the author they originated from, lest one's own theory be mistaken for that of the other author. And this involves answering the question: What *was* the original author's actual intent, anyway? It is in addressing this question that one often gains an unexpected benefit: one becomes aware of theories, arguments, and philosophical projects that may never have occurred to one and are perhaps undeveloped or even unknown in one's own philosophical tradition. In other words, one's own philosophical consciousness is expanded and enriched. And in this case, we are

talking about Dharmakīrti, one of the great "doctors" of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Surely, he had something very important to say that resulted in his being held in such high esteem in the Buddhist intellectual tradition. We ought to try to understand it, also, in his own terms, in its historical context.

Nor is providing a solution to the scheme-content problem what Dignāga is trying to do in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5. The question Dignāga is considering is, simply, What do words mean?, or even, How is meaning possible? He begins by examining a range of established theories: words refer to universals, to individuals, to individuals possessed of universals, and so on. He rejects all of them, chiefly on the grounds that they are inconsistent with observable linguistic practices. On the theory that words refer just to individuals, it would be impossible to learn the meanings of words, since the individuals a word can potentially be used to indicate are countless. If words referred to universals or particulars possessing universals or the *inherence* of the universal in particulars, they could not be used coreferentially (as when we say, "an existing pot"), nor could one expression be used to qualify another (as when we say, "blue lotus"). Note that Dignāga does not reject the universal and universal-possessor theories on the grounds that universals do not exist; nowhere in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5 does he argue against the existence of universals. Having dispensed with these and other alternatives, Dignāga introduces the Apohavāda – words refer to *apoha*s – as the only viable option.[26]

It is difficult to see in any of this a concern with anchoring language and thought in non-linguistic, non-conceptual reality. The primary concern, rather, is to devise a theory of word meaning that "saves the appearances," i.e., that accounts for actual linguistic practice. Children are able to learn what words mean; certain words can be used together with certain other words coreferentially but not with others; there is a hierarchy of meanings and concepts such that, if one hears the word "tree" one knows that the referent is earthen, a substance, an existing thing, and a knowable thing, but has doubt about what specific kind of tree it is, whether a *śiṃśapā* or a *palāśa*, etc.; and so forth. All of these phenomena, Dignāga maintains, can

[26] See Sen 2011: 173–178.

be explained only if one accepts that words refer to *apoha*s. Finally, Dignāga says nothing about how "double negation," that is to say, a combination of the two kinds of negation *prasajyapratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa*, makes it possible for an expression to extend over a whole class of individuals, without any commitment to universals – which Tillemans seems to consider as the hallmark of the top-down approach.[27]

Indeed, if one must choose one of the two approaches, top-down or bottom-up, in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5, the bottom-up approach seems a better fit. A bottom-up approach allegedly traces meanings and concepts back to perceptual experiences of particulars.[28] Although Dignāga does not tell anything like a Dharmakīrtian story of how particulars cause (distinct) cognitions that themselves yield "unitary judgments"

[27] Nor do Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, on whom Mark Siderits bases his "double negation" account, mention a *combination* of the negations *prasajyapratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa*. See, e.g., Siderits 1982:198–202, esp. 200; 1999: 347. What Siderits takes to be their combination, "A cow is not a non-cow," is actually what is considered *prasajyapratiṣedha* by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (see TS[P]ṣ 1009). Moreover, they are clear that the image or reflection of the object (*arthapratibimba*) that appears in a conceptual cognition, which is an *apoha* in the sense of *paryudāsa*, is the primary meaning of a word, not "not a non-cow" or (in their scheme) a *prasajyapratiṣedha*. TSPṣ 392,14–18: *yad eva hi śābde jñāne pratibhāsate sa eva śabdārtho yuktaḥ, na cātra prasajyapratiṣedhādhyavasāyo 'sti, na cāpīndriyajñānavat svalakṣaṇapratibhāsaḥ / kiṃ tarhi bāhyārthādhyavasāyinī kevalaṃ śābdī buddhir upajāyate / tena tad evārthapratibimbakaṃ śābde jñāne sākṣāt tadātmatayā pratibhāsanāc chabdārtho yuktaḥ, nānya iti bhāvaḥ /*. "That which appears in a verbal cognition alone is suitable as a word-meaning, and in this [verbal cognition] there is not the ascertainment of a *prasajyapratiṣedha*, nor the appearance of a particular, as in perception. Rather, merely a verbal cognition arises which 'ascertains' an external object. Therefore, precisely the reflection of an object, because it appears directly in a verbal cognition as identical with that [object], is appropriate as the meaning of a word, nothing else." After the [conceptual] image or reflection of the object is directly indicated by a word, a *prasajyapratiṣedha* in the form of "the nature of that image/reflection is not the nature of another image/reflection" is cognized "by implication" (*sāmarthyena*). However, that is the meaning of a word only in a figurative sense. See TS(P)ṣ 1012–1013. See McAllister 2020: 220, n. 332.

[28] As Siderits 2011: 284 puts it, a bottom-up approach consists essentially in an explanation of "concept possession ... using resources derived from a world containing only unique particulars."

(*ekapratyavamarśa*), which gives the impression that those cognitions are the same, thereby engendering the belief that the particulars that cause such cognitions are the same,[29] and how the conceptual cognition of their identity is then projected onto them as something that really belongs to them – although Dignāga does not give a complex psychological account like this, he does talk about how a certain *pattern* of experiencing particulars results in an awareness of *apoha*s. This is one of the central features of Dignāga's theory that becomes much clearer from studying Kumārila's critique; Kataoka's essay at the end of this volume is devoted to explaining it. Namely, one experiences, when a word is used, only particulars that fall within its extension, but never experiences particulars that do not. It is really, however, only by becoming aware of the latter that one learns what a word means. That is to say, the meaning of a word cannot be established or learned by observing a positive correlation (*anvaya*) between the use of the word and the individuals it refers to, maintains Dignāga; for a general term has infinitely many referents: the word "cow" refers to infinitely many cows. Rather, one learns what a word means simply by ascertaining what it is *not* used for, i.e., by negative correlation (*vyatireka*): one becomes aware that the word "cow" is *never* used for something that is other than a cow. In fact, however, as Dignāga will clarify, one does not do this by *observing* that "cow" is not used for this thing that is other than a cow and that thing that is other than a cow, and so on *ad infinitum*; for that would be as impossible as observing, positively, that it is used for all cows. Rather, one simply *does not observe* that it is used for non-cows.[30] Since this is primarily the way meanings are learned, the meanings we learn are exclusions. Given the predominantly negative way we come to comprehend what a word refers to, a word means, for one who has mastered the language, what is *not* other than the individuals it applies to; "cow" refers to what is *not* other than a cow.

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[29] PV(SV) 1.109.

[30] Exactly why Dignāga believes that the relation between a word and its meaning is more "easily" established by not observing it to be employed for other things than by observing a positive correlation, is a subtle matter that Kataoka investigates in his essay.

Thus, for Dignāga just as much as for Dharmakīrti, *apoha*s are derived from experiences of particulars. In Dignāga's case, however, the aspect of the experience of particulars that is of the most significance is just when they *are* experienced and when they *are not* experienced. An *apoha* is what we are aware of as a result of a pattern of *not* experiencing certain particulars under certain conditions; at such times, however, one must of course be experiencing *other* particulars. According to Dignāga's version of the Apohavāda, then, *apoha*s can be said to be "grounded" on our experiences of particulars, and this would make it closer to a bottom-up approach to the scheme-content problem than a top-down approach – if one must view it from the standpoint of these alternatives.[31]

These are some of the implications we believe a new translation of Kumārila's *Apohavāda* chapter will have for contemporary scholarship on *apoha*. For those primarily focused on the Buddhist position, we believe it will sharpen their grasp of what the Buddhist authors were trying to accomplish. Other prominent interpretations of Dharmakīrti, on which he is offering a "naturalized account of concept formation"[32] or a "causal account of intentionality,"[33] stand subject to revision or at least qualification in the same way as the interpretation that he is bridging the scheme-content gap. Nevertheless, there will remain much room for debate about these issues.

[31] Thus, we would also disagree with Arnold 2012: 125: "While we see that Dharmakīrti is concerned to offer an explanation of how conceptual mental content is constructed just from the causally describable inputs to awareness, Dignāga's elaboration of *apoha* doctrine, in contrast, evinces little concern with how linguistic items 'make contact' with the world of really existent particulars. Instead, his arguments address only the relative determinacy of conceptual content – the conceptual scope or richness of terms only insofar as they are relative to the other terms in a system."

[32] See Dunne 2011: 85–88 and Dreyfus 2011: 215–221.

[33] Arnold 2012: 133–157.