

Preface

For one week in April, 2012, scholars met in Vienna to jointly read a section of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, composed by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, an accomplished author and Nyāya philosopher, who flourished late in the ninth century of the common era.¹ The section discusses a complex ontological and epistemological problem, that of universals and how they are known.

Hattori (2006: 55) described the remarkable characteristics of the *Nyāyamañjarī* as follows:²

[...] it differs in its approach from other commentaries in that its arguments are developed freely without being overly concerned with the interpretation of the wording of individual *sūtras*.

[...] Jayanta was a scholar of great learning who was well-versed in the doctrines of many other schools, [...], and he weaves into his detailed examination [...] descriptions and critiques of the doctrines of other schools [...]. The *Nyāyamañjarī* is thus a valuable source of material [...] on the intellectual climate as a whole during the period during which he was active.

Expressed here are the two reasons for which the text was chosen for our joint reading: first, it is largely self-contained in that its arguments show coherence independently of what is being commented upon, the foundational text of the Nyāya school of thought. Second, Jayanta's deep knowledge of Indian philosophical theories outside his own school, and his eagerness to present and discuss these theories intelligibly, promised the discovery of connections to various other texts (and hence to other systems of thought). This situation allowed the authors of the articles in

1. From the sixteenth to the twentieth of April, 2012, the "Apoha Workshop" was held at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna. The workshop was financed by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) sponsored National Research Network (NFN) "The Cultural History of the Western Himalaya from the 8th Century (S98)" (<http://www.univie.ac.at/chwh/>), directed by Deborah Klimburg-Salter. This volume was edited within the DFG research grant "Systems of epistemology in classical Indian philosophy" (<http://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/226063163>) directed by Birgit Kellner. For very accessible overviews of what we know of Jayanta's life, see Csaba Dezső, ed. and trans. (2005). *Much Ado About Religion*. Clay Sanskrit Library. New York: New York University Press, JJC Foundation: Introduction, as well as Alessandro Graheli (2016). *History and Transmission of the Nyāyamañjarī*. *Critical Edition of the Section on the Sphoṭa*. Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 91. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: Chapter 1.

2. Masaaki Hattori (2006). "The Apoha Theory as Referred to in the *Nyāyamañjarī*". In: *Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute for Eastern Culture* 90, 55–70: 55; also in Mark Siderits, Tom J.F. Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti, eds. (2011). *Apoha. Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition*. New York: Columbia University Press: 134–148.

this volume to focus on the text from various perspectives, depending on their preference: one might satisfy a strictly philological-historical interest by investigating textual dependencies and relations, whilst another might find it more interesting to think through the ideas expressed in the arguments, rather than to analyse the concrete historical form they took in Jayanta's presentation. As you will see, the collection of articles in Part II of this volume runs the whole gamut of these possibilities, and many contributions contain elements of both philological acumen and philosophical speculation.

The intended format of the workshop is reflected in the bisection of this volume: the first part consists of an edition and translation of the sections read together in the morning sessions. Each participant in the meeting would tackle a sentence in turn, with ample time for debating alternative interpretations. The afternoons, which the second part of this volume corresponds to, were reserved for examining more general implications of what had been read in the morning, and revisiting problematic points in the light of these considerations. In practice, the morning and afternoon sessions tended to blend into each other, so that the two parts of this volume now suggest a stricter separation than there was during the workshop. Perhaps the reader will have the same experience, and find the need to revisit the edition and translation in the light of the articles.

Jayanta on *apoha*: Kumāṛila and the Buddhists (Part I)

The part of the *Nyāyamañjarī* at the center of this volume is that in which Jayanta is concerned with a peculiar theory of universals, the *apoha* theory, which was held by proponents of the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism.³ This part has four sections: Jayanta's summary of the Buddhist critique of universals; Kumāṛila's critique of the Buddhist's position; the Buddhist reply to this criticism; and, finally, Jayanta's own position. As a whole, this part of the *Nyāyamañjarī* would have been too long for the one week of the workshop, and so a restriction had to be made: the two middle sections were selected, because the historical debates seemed most lively here. This was somewhat unfair to Jayanta, since this meant that his final words on the issue would not be duly considered.

The general reasons for choosing Jayanta's text, explained above, proved correct: in the first of the two sections that were read, Jayanta utilizes the works of Kumāṛila to criticize the Buddhist theory of universals. Kumāṛila had mounted a famous attack on the Buddhist theory in the sixth century. Though he was a Mīmāṃsāka, and hence a potential opponent of Jayanta on certain issues, Jayanta did not hesitate to

3. See Kei Kataoka's introduction to the edition, in CHAPTER 1, for more details.

avail himself of Kumāṛila's arguments on this point, as can be seen from the many parallels that Kataoka has noted in his edition.

Kumāṛila's criticism had not gone unanswered by the Buddhists: in the following section, Jayanta drew heavily on the work of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara to counter Kumāṛila's attack. Again, Kataoka's careful edition makes it clear how well Jayanta knew the Buddhist material.

It is, therefore, possible to observe in these two sections how Jayanta skilfully reconstructed a historical exchange spanning three centuries in the form of a fluid dialogue focusing on what he took to be the main points of that debate. And even though the persons in this dialogue may be literary devices, their ideas, and often even their very words, were not mere inventions.

The joint reading of these two sections was made possible by the critical editions that Kataoka had published in 2008 and 2009 (cf. SECTION 1 in CHAPTER 1). His philological work was exemplary, and mitigated many of the usual problems encountered when reading difficult and precisely formulated texts from editions in which the exact wording often remains doubtful. The discussions during the workshop nevertheless prompted some rethinking of editorial decisions, and in this sense the text could still be improved upon. In this volume's first chapter, we have thus included Kataoka's revised editions of these two sections.

Before the workshop started, two draft-translations were circulated amongst the participants in order to provide to them a first starting point for their own interpretations and inquiries: one was prepared by Alex Watson and Kei Kataoka, and has now become the second chapter of this volume (see CHAPTER 2). The second translation was made by Hideyo Ogawa.

The edition and translation constitute the first part of this volume: they are the basis for the discussions that follow in the second part, directly for those engaging with Jayanta himself, or indirectly for those who developed their questions from topics found in Jayanta.

The discussions (Part II)

The studies contributed to this volume, collected in its second part, are sorted according to the date of the main subject matter of each article. This gives them a roughly historical sequence, and so follows the presentation which Jayanta himself chose for the *apoha* section of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

The discussions start with **Hideyo Ogawa's** study on Dignāga's solution to co-referentiality (CHAPTER 3). Ogawa's is an impressive study of the strong influence of Bhartṛhari on the 'inventor' (my term) of the *apoha* theory, Dignāga, and focuses on one of the core problems that any theory of universals has to face: how can multiple universals qualify the same thing, or common terms refer to the same thing?

It is followed by **Pascale Hugon's** analysis of the consequences of Dharmakīrti's usage of the terms *excluded* and *exclusion* that can still be seen in Jayanta's work (CHAPTER 4). Hugon provides a thoughtful and clear investigation of the changes that these notions, both related to the excluded thing, had undergone before Jayanta, a development that might well explain some of the difficult points that Jayanta shows his peers to be debating.

Next is **Kensho Okada's** study of how an early commentator on Dharmakīrti, Śākyabuddhi, understood and tried to systematize the theory of exclusion (CHAPTER 5). Okada studies his interpretation of *apoha*, and draws consequences that indicate a need to re-evaluate the historical development of the *apoha* theory.

This is then followed by two studies focusing on Dharmottara's *apoha* theory. **Hisataka Ishida** presents the topical verse opening Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa* (CHAPTER 6). He provides a reconstruction and translation of that verse, and discusses its main points, concisely showing how Jayanta's choice of topics to discuss in the *apoha* section is close to Dharmottara's own notion of the main points that he himself further explicated.

Kei Kataoka then examines what the actual object of words and concepts is for Dharmottara, and what its ontological status might be (CHAPTER 7). Kataoka's close scrutiny of what the ultimately illusory object fabricated by words and concepts could actually be uncovers an important difference between Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's theories, one which Jayanta had clearly perceived.

There follows a more generally philosophical essay, in which **Elisa Freschi** and **Artemij Keidan** investigate Jayanta's understanding of the word-object relation on the broader background of how to approach conceptually (and often temporally) remote texts (CHAPTER 8). They reflect on what concept of word-meaning Jayanta could have had, considering the wider context of chapter five of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, in which the *apoha* section occurs.

Last is my own attempt to see whether Buddhist authors following Jayanta possibly had a similar view of the *apoha* theory's development as he did (CHAPTER 9). To this end, I examine a passage that is seemingly shared by Trilocana and Dharmottara, in which they consider a way to bridge a gap between non-conceptual and conceptual cognition.

This arrangement of the articles is only a recommendation. We, whose work is here collected, hope that the reader will engage with the different questions asked below, and will enjoy exploring this episode in the history of philosophy.

Note The workshop was planned by Helmut Krasser, Parimal Patil, and myself. Patil was unfortunately not able to attend the meeting in Vienna, but was much involved in the preparations, and offered a lot of help in completing this volume.

The symposium took place just before my teacher, Helmut Krasser, was diagnosed with the disease that resulted in his untimely death. The spirit of the

meeting—open to differing scholarly approaches and to the probing of unusual lines of inquiry—was surely due to his unconventional way of thinking. I hope this can still be felt in this volume.

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