Foreword

The present volume deals with the questioning, challenging, evaluating and legitimatizing of revealed or inspired speech in connection with its authority in practically relevant matters (ritual, morals, soteriology, etc.). In other words, this book examines scriptural authorization as it has been dealt with in various media (political as well as philosophical discourse, myths, images, objects), in rhetorical strategies, and in finalities (doctrinal, apologetic, "heresiological," political, etc.). From very early times, India found itself in the situation of having a "market" of religions that had competing truth-claims and – could it be otherwise? – mutual rivalry with regard to sociopolitical legitimacy, economic support, and confessional predominance. As early as 400 BCE, the Buddhists, Jains and Ājīvikas (to name only three) had begun to contest the validity of the Vedic religion, as well as its soteriological relevance and normativity. Yet to come were numerous other groups that would challenge already existing denominations and attempt to negotiate or enforce positions of power both within and outside their own milieu of origin: Mahāyānists, Sāṅkhyas, Śaiva Pāśupatas and Kāpālikas, Vaiṣṇava Pañcarātras, Buddhist and non-Buddhist Tāntrikas, etc. All of them tried to create new space – space for rediscovered truths, space for conversion, space for power. And they all developed artistic, institutional and rhetorical means for enhancing their visibility and legitimizing their claims of truth. In ancient India maybe more than anywhere else, to exist and survive as a philosophic-religious denomination meant both defending oneself against external criticism and advertising one's monopoly on salvation.

We do not claim, however, to be providing a comprehensive analysis of these matters in this volume. Indeed, even if we limit our

scope to about 1,500 years of Indic history (c. 500 BCE–1,000 CE), it will only be possible to deal with the issue of scriptural authority and authorization in a manner that might be described as impressionistic. We have no illusions that to be all-inclusive or to offer overall theoretical relevance would be an unfeasible task. Nonetheless, when organizing the panel "Scriptural Authority and Apologetics in the Indian Religio-Philosophical Environment" for the XIVth World Sanskrit Conference (University of Kyōto, 1–5 September 2009, "Buddhist Studies" section), the conveners and now editors chose to invite specialists in as many Indic religio-philosophical traditions as possible. They were solicited with the following text:

> "**1a.** ***Scriptural/religious authority as a philosophical and epistemological issue.*** – Which epistemological status can scripture/religious authority claim in the system of human knowledge? Is there a distinct jurisdiction (e.g., the *acintya*, or the *atīndriya*) for scripture, or does/can it overlap with other, empirical sources of knowledge? How can the truth or reliability of a given textual tradition be assessed? Is a concept of scripturally based rationality available? Can reason(ing) and scripture contradict each other? Can reason(ing) alone shape morals and goal-oriented practice? **1b.** ***Scriptural/religious authority as a hermeneutical and exegetical issue.*** – What does scripture consist of? What may lay claim to authority/canonicity, and on which basis? Does the issue of scriptural authenticity/authentication become a philosophical question? To what extent is exegesis (e.g., varying levels of interpretation) involved in settling philosophical questions? **2a.** ***Apologetics and/in Indian philosophy.*** – How developed is the apologetic concern in a given philosophical tradition or even a single text/author? In which way(s) does philosophy provide apologetics with methods, techniques or doctrinal agenda? How do philosophers and dogmaticians claim rationality for the scriptural tradition which they defend or promote? Are there forms of apologetic rhetoric other than appeals to credibility and claims of rationality? Can Indian philosophy (and philosophy in general) be easily dissociated from apologetic concerns? **2b.** ***Apologetics and/in Indian history.*** – Can non-philosophical, historical (social, political, economic, institutional) circumstances be interpreted as having been instrumental in the development of apologetic endeavours within a tradition? Have, e.g., the practice of debate, scho-

larly institutions, internal and external hostility, economic pressure or political events had a share in shaping certain apologetic agenda?"

As a result of these questions, the panel's programme, held on a long, hot and humid day (2 September 2009), was the following (excluding lunch and coffee breaks):

11^{00}–11^{30}	P. Skilling	Invoking the Buddha: The power of *buddha-vacana* in *sūtra* and *dhāraṇī*
11^{30}–12^{00}	J. Walser	*sūtra* vs. *śāstra*: a sociological perspective
12^{00}–12^{30}	T. Horiuchi	Mahāyāna and Vaipulya: Focusing on the proof of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna
14^{00}–14^{30}	P. Balcerowicz	Omniscience of the Jina and the truth of Jainism
14^{30}–15^{00}	K. Kataoka	Transmission of scripture: Exegetical problems for Kumārila and Dharmakīrti
15^{00}–15^{30}	V. Eltschinger	Towards a genealogy of the Buddhist epistemologists' apologetics
15^{50}–16^{20}	H. Krasser	Dharmakīrti on the unreliability of scripture
16^{20}–16^{50}	S. Moriyama	On the relationship between scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*) and the fallacious thesis contradicted by scripture (*āgamavirodha*)
16^{50}–17^{20}	S. McClintock	Kamalaśīla on scripture and reason: The limits and extent of 'practical rationality' in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*
17^{40}–18^{10}	H. Marui	Examination of the meaning of '*prāmāṇya*' with special reference to its use for the Veda or 'verbal testimony' (*śabda*) in the *codanā-sūtrādhikaraṇa* of the *Ślokavārttika* and some Nyāya texts
18^{10}–18^{40}	R. Torella	*prasiddhi* and *pratibhā*

In the end, however, the contents of the present volume diverge from this list of presentations. For various reasons, Hiroshi Marui and Toshio Horiuchi unfortunately had to withdraw their stimulating contributions, thus depriving us of important insights into Nyāya

philosophy and Mahāyāna exegesis and apologetics. It was of course not possible to replace the papers of these outstanding Japanese scholars with work by others covering similar areas. But luckily, it was the editors' good fortune to have been able to recruit contributions from two of the *fine fleur* of French specialists on Indian philosophy, namely, Isabelle Ratié, whose remarkable work on Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta needs no further introduction, and Hugo David, an expert on Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The editors asked them (in July 2010 and December 2011, respectively) whether they would be willing to write papers on the topic in question despite deadlines that were threatening if not already passed. Thus, while the editors could not include examinations of the Brahmanical Nyāya and the Buddhist *Vyākhyāyukti*, they gained a significant work on early Vedānta and a second study on the Pratyabhijñā School. Since this school is regrettably quite an understudied field, the editors are especially happy to offer two outstanding papers dedicated to the Pratyabhijñā's highly original way of dealing with authority, competing religio-philosophical traditions, and the relationship between reason and scripture.

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The present volume opens with contributions focusing on two Buddhist strategies, in part narrative, that are designed to authorize (Buddhist) speech and speakers, namely, the Buddha's "long tongue of truth" (Peter Skilling) and the Buddhists' appropriation of high seats and daises as authorizing devices (Joseph Walser). Like the lion's roar, the Buddha's "exceptional, stupendous, and spectacular tongue," which belongs to the thirty-two marks of a "great man" (*mahāpuruṣa*), is "an outstanding and unique engine of authority in Buddhist narrative." As Skilling remarks, "the authority of the Buddha is established physically" by "extraordinary bodily features." The narrative device of the two hidden marks (the long tongue and the sheathed male organ) being verified by sceptical brahmins "reflects a phase in the early social context of Buddhism, a period in which there was a need to demonstrate the superiority of the Buddha vis à vis the brahmins and other religious systems." In other narratives, "the display of the tongue" works "as a guarantee of truth, again to brahmins." Gradually, the preachers developed new priorities in

response to changing contexts: "The display of the tongue was no longer used to impress and convert brahmins; it came to figure in fully Buddhist contexts, and to be used for dramatic effect within Buddhist circles." In a similar way, the preaching chair or dais (Buddhism knows of at least three of these "important part[s] of the everyday furniture of the monastery": the *uccāsana* or "high chair," the *siṃhāsana* or "lion throne," and the *dharmāsana* or "dharma seat") is one of the "the physical props that frame and authorize a particular scripture *as Buddhist*." According to Walser, "the connection of the preaching seat with sovereign authority" represents "a sectarian iteration of a pan-Indian phenomenon," since "the trope of the throne and enthronement remains a fairly stable index of authority within the Indic cultural sphere." This, of course, is especially true of the lion throne, which was "designed to meld religious power to widely established images of political power." The author's thesis here is that "there was a culturally understood reciprocal authorization between the *sūtra* as a genre and the fact that its salient instantiation would have been framed by such a dais." In other words, "to have access to the dais becomes the best route to authorize a given message as legitimately 'Buddhist,' and for that reason one of the more important stakes in any ideological struggle."

The next group of papers are variously related to the so-called epistemological school, one of the most outstanding intellectual phenomena of late Indian Buddhism (500–1300 CE). At some point during the sixth century, Dharmakīrti laid the foundations of an exhaustive system of human rationality designed to cover both human judgement (the proper use of the *pramāṇa*s or "means of valid cognition") and human practice (successful purposive action), or equivalently, both *yukti*, "reason(ing)" (the realm of ascertained valid cognition as opposed to belief and faith) and *prekṣā*, *prudentia* (according to which religious belief *can* be rational provided certain conditions are fulfilled). In a genealogical vein, Vincent Eltschinger attempts to show how and why earlier Yogācāra notions in the areas of exegetics and soteriology came to coalesce around an apologetically relevant concept of human reason that broke with the aims and methods of earlier scholasticism. As has long been recognized, Dharmakīrti's ideas

concerning scriptural authority are strongly indebted to a short passage in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (2.5ab and *Vṛtti*). Nonetheless, two generations of scholars have puzzled over the meaning and original Sanskrit wording of this passage. In his paper, Helmut Krasser suggests that a close comparison with Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya* provides an important key to understanding Dignāga's ideas. But how is it that the two extant Tibetan translations of Dignāga's work as well as Jinendrabuddhi's commentary thereon have resisted all attempts at reconstructing a Sanskrit *wording* that is philologically satisfactory? According to Krasser, Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* lends itself to the same conclusions as Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*: far from being (or reflecting) different exemplars of one and the same original (and duly published) composition, the texts we possess today are nothing but (more or less carefully edited) notes taken by these masters' *students*. Needless to say, such a conclusion has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of Indian philosophy as well as the very nature of textual criticism when applied to philosophical texts. As Eltschinger's and Krasser's essays make clear, the Buddhist epistemologists' approach to scriptural authority is chiefly evaluative. Evaluating what a given treatise has to say about empirical things is not particularly problematic. But how can one assess a scripture's discourse on transempirical matters, which are *ipso facto* unverifiable and unfalsifiable? This is the focus of the Buddhist philosophers' "scripturally based inference" (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*), the subject matter of Shinya Moriyama's and Sara McClintock's contributions. The nature and the function of this type of inference, which these Buddhist philosophers regard as the only *rational* way of dealing with supersensible things, have long been misunderstood. Moriyama's paper clearly settles the matter by providing ample textual evidence showing that this type of inference, far from letting scriptural statements inform us absolutely about supersensible states of affairs, merely consists in the search for internal contradictions or inconsistencies in a given treatise or scripture. This search is based on one's provisional acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of a treatise's description of a certain subject as being this or that. According to Moriyama, this and other features of this type of inference (which looks like "an updated version of the fallacious

thesis called *pūrvābhyupagamaviruddha*" in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*) make it structurally very similar to the Buddhist epistemologists' antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) and the Nyāya's "hypothetical tenet" (*abhyupagamasiddhānta*) and "incoherency" (*viruddha*). In other words, the Buddhist logicians' scripturally based inference, anchored as it is in the Indian dialectical tradition, serves purely evaluational and polemical purposes and was *never* designed as a means for increasing one's knowledge of (definitionally) unascertainable states of affairs. McClintock's contribution examines the same inference within the general context of "practical rationality" as defined and elaborated by the two eighth-century philosophers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in their *Tattvasaṅgraha(pañjikā)*. As McClintock rightly emphasizes, the reason for their insistence on this rhetorical device is that "one of the most important tasks of rational discourse is [...] to provide rational persons with rational justifications for seeking this soteriological goal [= perfect buddhahood or omniscience]." But how does this epistemologically neglected (and formally obscure) inference function? What is its place in the general economy of human knowledge? To what extent can human beings deal with religiously relevant things (such as the relation between acts and their results) without resorting to any scripturally based knowledge of supersensible states of affairs? What are the limits of human (practical) rationality? McClintock attempts to answer these questions by translating and discussing some of the most relevant excerpts from these two Nālandā scholars' important work. It is indeed a fascinating thing to see how these champions of rationality dealt with traditionally handed down and at times mythical accounts of cosmology, moral retribution, spiritual attainments and soteriology.

This was of course not the exclusive concern of Buddhist intellectuals, for all Indic religio-philosophical traditions faced the same theoretical problems. The same topic was no less hotly debated among the Jainas in connection to both the Jina's omniscience (which supposedly legitimizes authority of the Jaina scriptures) and the plurality of the competing truth-claims (which questions this very authoritativeness, at least as far as exclusivity is concerned).

According to Piotr Balcerowicz, the early medieval period marked, also for the Jainas, the "transition from a phase when the acceptance of the reliability of the original teachers was based primarily on belief to a phase when belief was either replaced or accompanied by the work of reason." And thus it is that the most outstanding Jaina logicians and philosophers (Siddhasena, Haribhadra, Akalaṅka, etc.) developed numerous strategies to authorize their scriptures and to demonstrate the Jina's exceptionality in cognitional, ethical and salvational matters. Balcerowicz's taxonomical approach to the many arguments devised by the Jains to demonstrate the validity of their scriptures does more than simply provide a list (the argument based on scripture, the argument based on the efficacy of the teaching, the argument based on progression, the argument based on potentiality, etc.). He also compares them to Western (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Berkeley) and Buddhist (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara) validity arguments and attempts to show, in a somewhat pessimistic vein, that "as it is usually the case in apologetic and religious literature, all the arguments to prove the authoritative character of the Jina and the Jina's teaching" suffer from logical flaws and inconsistencies (circularity, quantifier-shift fallacy, equivocation, confusion of modalities, etc.).

From the early sixth century onwards, the Mīmāṃsā, a school of Vedic hermeneutics with a strong apologetic leaning, was Buddhism's (and to a lesser extent, Jainism's) mortal enemy. The struggle between Vedic orthodoxy (or one should rather say "orthopraxy") and Buddhism involved much more than a disagreement about harmless philosophical technicalities. As Kei Kataoka's contribution shows, what most concerned the two major representatives of these traditions (Kumārila and Dharmakīrti) was defending their respective scriptures' authoritativeness and normativity. Authorizing the Vedic *smṛti*s, the normative works of *human* origin, without *ipso facto* providing the Buddhist or Jaina scriptures with the same kind of legitimation was one of the most serious hermeneutic problems faced by the Mīmāṃsā. Was one to postulate – as done also by the Buddhist Vaibhāṣikas and Mahāyānists – that there were lost Vedic recensions? Was one to make authority and normativity depend on

the legislators' personal motivations and/or social status? Kataoka's familiarity with these two traditions allows him to create a dialogue between Kumārila's and Dharmakīrti's most relevant texts, which allows him to give a penetrating account of the proper religious background and motivations of this philosophical rivalry.

But the sixth- to seventh-century Mīmāṃsā not only had to rebuke the Buddhist objections against Vedic authority. Within Brahmanism itself, and probably also within Mīmāṃsā circles, there were challenges to this school's nearly exclusive concern with Vedic injunctions (*codanā*, *vidhi*) and the modification of the "great" Upaniṣadic statements into mere explanatory sentences (*arthavāda*) devoid of any independent validity (*prāmāṇya*). The Mīmāṃsaka (a direct disciple of Kumārila?) and early Vedāntin Maṇḍana Miśra seems to have played a major role in this context. His contribution to these discussions is the subject matter of a concentrated and insightful essay by Hugo David. According to David, Maṇḍana Miśra's doctrine of injunctive discourse exhibits two features that "directly served an *apologetic* as well as *exegetical* purpose" and resulted in a "radical subversion" of the Grammarians' (especially Bhartṛhari's) analysis of *liṅ*, etc. The first characteristic, a strong move towards "depersonalization," was meant to "reconcile linguistic analysis with the possibility of an injunction by the authorless Veda," that is, "to provide a linguistic basis for one of Mīmāṃsā's most fundamental assumptions, the Veda's impersonality." In order to do so, Maṇḍana added a fourth element to the Grammarians' threefold analysis of injunctive speech. To command, request and permission, where the speaker apparently prevails, Maṇḍana added instruction (*upadeśa*). The specific content or import of instruction is (the knowledge of) *iṣṭasādhanatā*, "being a means for realizing a desired end." In other words, the "instruction" aspect of injunctive discourse exhausts itself by indicating an object that suits the pragmatic expectations of the hearer. In this innovative analysis, "the role of the speaker uttering an injunction (*vidhātṛ*) is reduced [...] to the mere transmission of a piece of information about a means of realization and its relationship to an expected result." Maṇḍana did not only add this fourth "meaning," but also universalized it so that the four meanings

turn out to be nothing other than "different modes of presentation of a single, universal meaning, which does not always appear with the same degree of clarity." In other words, "*all* (Vedic and worldly) injunctions" have an identical content. We thus see how Maṇḍana Miśra achieved his second ambition, reducing prescription to description and injunctive speech to declarative discourse. But in doing this, Maṇḍana "paved the way for a specifically Vedāntic interpretation of the nature and object of the Vedic *corpus* as a whole" by providing the "distinction between 'injunctions' (*vidhi*, such as 'Let him who desires heaven sacrifice!'), 'explanatory statements' (*arthavāda*) and 'sentences of the Vedānta' (*vedāntavākya*, such as 'Brahman is consciousness, bliss')" with an exegetical foundation. According to Maṇḍana Miśra's view of injunctive discourse, the Vedic injunction and the Upaniṣadic assertion ultimately amount to the same thing (and are endowed with the same independent validity): an *upadeśa*, that is, a statement indicating an existing object (the sacrifice, Brahman) which is desirable inasmuch as it is beneficial.

In tenth-century Kashmir, the Śaiva philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta were the promoters of the non-dualist Pratyabhijñā ("Recognition") School – an allegedly "new path" that resorted to rational enquiry alone and confined the Śaiva scriptures to a purely corroborative role. But, asks Isabelle Ratié, how can such autonomy be claimed for human reason by authors who, like Bhartṛhari and the Naiyāyikas before them, regard perception and inference as ultimately resting on, subordinate to, and made possible by *āgama* itself? Here as elsewhere, the Pratyabhijñā philosophers introduce subtle semantic and conceptual distinctions. What they have in mind in this regard is *āgama* in the sense of *prasiddhi* (literally, "common knowledge/usage"), a "kind of a priori certainty" that is anterior to reasoning and experience and conditions both. It is not simply a "speech or text considered authoritative by a certain religious tradition" – which would make their initial claim contradictory. According to them, *āgama* is, first and foremost, a "strong, nonperceptual and noninferential realization (*vimarśa*)," that is, Śiva's own self-realization or self-awareness, of which the various religious traditions are ultimately nothing but more or less adequate expressions. Inter-

estingly enough, these philosophers consider these allodox and alloprax scriptures unobjectionably authoritative for the practitioner who puts faith in them, and *as long as* (s)he does put faith in them. Does this amount to a relativistic or perspectivistic approach to religious authority? Certainly not, according to Ratié, provided one regards the empirically existing scriptures as "included within an Ur-*āgama*" representing Śiva's self-realization and as hierarchically ordained according to their relative faithfulness to this self-realization. Not surprisingly, the hierarchy "culminates in the Śaiva non-dualistic all-encompassing scriptures," a feature that clearly ensures the system's inclusivistic stand and makes any contradiction between scriptures impossible. Indeed, "hierarchy ensures non-contradiction because lower scriptures can be seen as partial or incomplete aspects of the ultimate *āgama*." In other words, "all scriptures can be considered valid means of knowledge" for those who believe in them, "and yet all scriptures but the Śaivas' are ultimately erroneous because they are partial aspects of Śiva's self-awareness." Thus it is that Ratié's masterful study allows us to fully appreciate the true meaning and function of autonomous reasoning in the Pratyabhijñā system: "The Pratyabhijñā philosophers thus present reason's power as merely cathartic: reason can only *eliminate* wrong opinions that distract the individual from his or her own most inner and undeniable experience, and it can do so by *purifying* experience from wrong philosophical theses."

This is reminiscent of the Buddhist understanding of philosophy as a critical examination (*parīkṣā*). According to Raffaele Torella, Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's doctrine of *prasiddhi* ≈ *āgama* likely targeted, above all, the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila, who vehemently dismissed any form of *prasiddhi* as a criterion of *dharma* and *adharma*: "Kumārila must have seen the 'universalistic' approach to revealed scripture as upheld by Bhartṛhari as being very dangerous. It is true that Bhartṛhari focuses on the Veda, but, apart from the corpus of texts in which the Veda is embodied, he envisages a higher level, a kind of subtle Veda made of *pratibhā* and *śabdatattva* which lies in the depths of all men, or even of all living creatures." Defending Bhartṛhari's views against Kumārila's, while using a term unknown

to Bhartṛhari and discarded by the great Mīmāṃsaka, might have been the purpose of the Pratyabhijñā philosophers. Whatever the case may be, *prasiddhi*/*āgama* is an "open structure" siding with "action" rather than "cognition," something that is "not bound to remain an inner belief, but enacts specific practical behaviours." As already pointed out above, there is "a single ultimate source for all *prasiddhi*s," in which they are all contained, viz. Parameśvara or Bhairava. And indeed, *prasiddhi* "coincides with the very voice of the Lord," while the Lord constitutes the innermost essence of all creatures. In other words, "[t]his active divine presence […] has the form of the innate language principle which imbues all cognitions and actions. It is the Voice (*vāc*) of the Lord that speaks in living beings." As we have already seen, all *prasiddhi*s are equally authoritative, but "of the totality of *prasiddhi*s that are contained in the creature, those that gradually appear or 'emerge' match the spiritual level reached by the individual subject, or […] are in accordance with its specific ends." As Torella nicely puts it, "[a] continuous line runs from the individually oriented *prasiddhi*s which are at work in the everyday experience of living beings and the progressively higher *prasiddhi*s, which give shape to the various world views, that is, the various *āgama*s – from the Veda to the Bauddha, the Pañcarātra, the Śaiva – culminating in the all-encompassing *eka āgama*."

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Let it be noted, finally, that the editors may – and actually do – disagree with some of the views expressed in the present volume. In their opinion, however, censure of any sort is worse than possible erroneous views (of course as long as such views do not threaten either society or individuals – which is no real danger in the case of classical Indology and Buddhist Studies). As a consequence, they have opted for a fairly liberal and non-invasive approach to editing their friends' and colleagues' papers – not requesting additional arguments or textual evidence despite sometimes feeling that the offered evidence is insufficient, refraining from regarding a given philosophical tradition (say… analytical philosophy) as owning property rights over words and concepts, and accepting that English is a second (and sometimes even a third or a fourth) language for many of

us. (Publication deadlines and financial restrictions made it impossible to have all the papers written by non-native English speakers systematically checked by native speakers.) In the same spirit, the editors have decided not to unify the authors' styles, bibliographical conventions and editorial practices as long as these have been consistent.

It is the editors' pleasant duty to express their heartfelt gratitude to all those who participated, actively or otherwise, in the Kyōto panel, and to those who, by taking on the enormous task of organizing an event as large as the Kyōto conference and by shaping its specific sections, made both this panel and this book possible. In this we are thinking especially of Akihiko Akamatsu, Akira Saito and Kazunobu Matsuda.

Vincent Eltschinger and Helmut Krasser

Vienna, October 2012