

# Introduction

## 1 Purpose and scope

**1.1** This dissertation is centred on presenting an annotated English translation of chapter five of the sixth century A.D. Buddhist philosopher Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV V). In this important chapter Dignāga expounds his philosophy of language known as the *apoha* theory or thesis of *anyāpoha* "exclusion of other referents,"<sup>1</sup> which affected post-Dignāga philosophical debate in India for centuries. The original Sanskrit version of *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV) is no longer extant. Except for a few Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature, the only comprehensive sources available for the study of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine are two mediocre Tibetan translations of PSV included in the Tibetan *bsTan 'gyur* and a small number of Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature. Thus, the English translation of PSV V is based upon its two Tibetan versions and Sanskrit fragments published in Hattori 1982, including Sanskrit fragments I have traced to other sources. The translation is accompanied and supported by a critical edition<sup>2</sup> of the bulk of the corresponding fifth chapter of the single Sanskrit manuscript of *Viśālāmalavatī Ṭīkā* (hence PST V). This unique *Ṭīkā* attributed to Jinendrabuddhi, a central eighth century A.D. Indian grammari-

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<sup>1</sup> Essential means for studying Dignāga's *apoha* theory were published in 1976 by Muni Jambūvijayajī in the second volume of his monumental edition of Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakram*. This volume includes Sanskrit restorations of crucial passages of PSV V based upon the evidence presented in Siṃhasūri's work and the Tibetan translations of PSV V, as well as the Tibetan translation of Jinendrabuddhi's PST V included in the *bsTan 'gyur*. These brilliant reconstructions have served many scholars as the only trustworthy introduction to essential aspects of the *apoha* theory as presented in PSV V. An annotated English translation of selected passages of the fifth chapter based upon its Tibetan translations and Sanskrit fragments is published in Hayes 1988.

<sup>2</sup> The critical edition leaves out a few insignificant passages and Jinendrabuddhi's erudite comment on *upacāra*; independent paragraphs are edited separately; see 4. below.

an and philosopher, is the only extant commentary on PSV and thus an important source of information on the philosophical context in which Dignāga propagated his work, and the Sanskrit text of PSV as known to Jinendrabuddhi.

**1.2** The purpose of the translation is to present a faithful English version of the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources. All crucial paragraphs of PST V and other chapters of Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* are translated in the annotations, as well as citations of Sanskrit or Tibetan sources if they are important for understanding Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine. Sanskrit or Tibetan quotations are rendered into English with the background of current knowledge of the vocabulary and technical terms of classical Indian grammatical and philosophical literature.<sup>3</sup> Sanskrit terms inserted in round brackets reflect the vocabulary of the Sanskrit sources. Those marked with an asterisk are hypothetical restorations suggested by the Tibetan translations and the context as presented in the Sanskrit vocabulary reflected in PST. In order to avoid ambiguity a limited number of exegetical additions are added in square brackets if suggested by the context and Jinendrabuddhi's exegesis. The annotations are intended to explain in exacting detail the philological evidence contained in Hattori 1982, PST V, and other relevant Sanskrit or Tibetan sources.

**1.3** The difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations of PSV are well known and in some cases almost insuperable. I have therefore taken advantage of the Sanskrit evidence embodied in PST V and restored into Sanskrit many paragraphs of the presumably original version of PSV V if the Sanskrit evidence of PST V is matched by the Tibetan translations of PSV V. Crucial passages from other chapters of PSV are also restored if they shed light on the philosophical issues addressed in PSV V. The restorations are primarily established on the basis of *pratīkas* quoted in PST and Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases of Dignāga's presentation of his philosophy in PSV. Independent Sanskrit sources that corroborate the restorations are quoted too. The method applied to restore the Sanskrit text of PSV V and other relevant sections of PSV is outlined below (see 5.1–9). The Sanskrit restorations are presented

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Oberhammer et al. 1991–2006; Abhyankar 1961; Renou 1957.

in separate annotations that lay out their sources in a straightforward and comprehensive way.

**1.4** Dignāga's "*apoha* theory" is an essential complement to his theory of knowledge and logic. Since it generated an incessant debate among contemporary and subsequent generations of Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian philosophers, and continues to elicit questions among Dignāga's modern Western interpreters about the meaning and purpose of *anyāpoha*, this work includes a fresh study of its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V.<sup>4</sup> The objective is to clarify fundamental theoretical issues in the light of the Sanskrit evidence of Jinendrabuddhi's PST V, as it is no longer necessary to address the inherent ambiguities of the opaque Tibetan sources.<sup>5</sup>

## 2 *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V*

### The purpose of PSV V

**2.1** The fifth chapter on exclusion follows the crucial chapter on the role of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in inference, succeeded by the final chapter six on the *jāti*s, "sophistical reasons." Its place in Dignāga's treatise is undoubtedly motivated by the frequent reference to "exclusion" (*vyavaccheda*, *apoha*) or "preclusion" (*nivṛtti*) in the preceding chapters. Thus the aim of PSV V, which presents the essentials of the *apoha* thesis, is to supplement previous statements about exclusion or preclusion with an exposition of the *apoha* doctrine itself.

**2.2** As the title *Pramāṇasamuccaya* indicates, Dignāga composed PSV as a compendium (*samuccaya*) of his works on epistemology and logic, the intention being to provide scholars and students with a summary of his philosophy on the assumption that if needed they would refer to

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<sup>4</sup> The *apoha* theory was interpreted by Th. Stcherbatsky as presupposing "The law of double negation," which has left its indelible mark on Western interpretations of the *apoha* thesis, cf. Stcherbatsky 1962, vol. 1: 417.

<sup>5</sup> I addressed essential features of Dignāga's *apoha* theory in my published papers on the subject. See Pind 1991, and Pind 1999.

the detailed expositions of his other works. Thus, PSV is marked by extreme economy of presentation and tantalizing ellipsis. Given the limited number of extant works by Dignāga it is not possible to place PSV in the context of Dignāga's philosophical oeuvre, as all of his works on logic and epistemology except PSV and the Chinese versions of *Nyāyamukha* (hence NMu) are no longer extant.<sup>6</sup> Dignāga must have regarded NMu as a current exposition of his philosophy of inference when he composed PSV because he always mentions this work first when referring to his works on epistemology and logic.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, there is not a single quotable instance in all of PSV where it is not mentioned first. In the final chapter six of PSV Dignāga mentions *Nyāyaparīkṣā*, *Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā*, and *Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā*;<sup>8</sup> and *Nyāyamukha* refers once to *Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā*.<sup>9</sup> This makes it possible to conclude that most if not all of the *parīkṣās* including *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyaśa* (hence SPVy) – apparently the main source of PSV V (see 2.3) – were written before Dignāga composed PSV to summarize his works on epistemology and logic.

**2.3** It is commonly assumed that PSV records the final stage of development of Dignāga's thought. However, we cannot *a priori* exclude the possibility that Dignāga composed other works after PSV, which presupposes and presumably to a large extent is based upon earlier works. He exploited the SPVy for the crucial fifth chapter. Jinendrabuddhi quotes two passages from this work, and he refers to it once (see 5.13). It is thus certain that PSV V is based upon the earlier work. It is doubtless SPVy to which Yijing refers in *Nan hai ji gui hei fa zhuan* (T 2125: 230a6) under the title *Guan zong xiang lun \*Sāmānya(lakṣaṇa) parīkṣā*<sup>10</sup> of which only a fragment of eleven verses are included in the

<sup>6</sup> A Sanskrit manuscript of *Nyāyamukha* is found among the Sanskrit manuscripts stored in Potala; see Steinkellner/Much 1995: xix.

<sup>7</sup> The references are usually presented as *Nyāyamukha* and so on.

<sup>8</sup> He refers to *Nyāyaparīkṣā* in PSV VI; cf. Hattori 1968: *Introduction* n. 51; Pind 2001: 157 n. 30; v. next.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Hattori 1968: n. 53.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Pind 1999: n. 3. The Chinese translation would indicate that the term *lakṣaṇa* was part of the original title, which is unlikely. Simhasūri refers to Dignāga as *Sāmānyaparīkṣākāra* at NCV 628,8 and indicates that

Chinese Buddhist canon (T 1623) under the same title.<sup>11</sup> As the qualification *vyāsa* added to the original Sanskrit title indicates, it must have been a comprehensive treatise. Uddyotakara is no doubt addressing statements from this work in his criticism of the *apoha* theory. For instance, he closes his presentation of Dignāga's arguments by quoting an important prose fragment which cannot be traced to PSV V. It seems, however, to belong in the same context as PSV V 11d that ends the first section of PSV V.<sup>12</sup>

**2.4** Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the scope of the philosophical issues which Dignāga addresses in PSV V to a large extent reflects the philosophical discourse of SPVy, although the treatment of the subjects in SPVy undoubtedly would mirror the qualification *vyāsa* appended to the title of the treatise: it must have been a full and comprehensive treatment of its subject matter. Although the evidence shows that Uddyotakara addresses issues identical with those presented in PSV V 1–11, there are nonetheless conspicuous differences. As mentioned above, he quotes a prose fragment that would seem to belong in the context of the final statement of PS V 11d,<sup>13</sup> but there is nothing comparable in PSV V 11d, which one would expect. Moreover, there is a particular quotation that Uddyotakara attributes to Dignāga and rejects as untenable in his *apoha* critique, which has no parallel in PSV V, cf. *Nyāyavārttika* (hence NV) 325,14–15: *yac cedam ucyate tvayā: parikalpitāḥ sattāśabdā iti tad api na*. He also quotes a slightly edited version of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (hence VP) III 14.8,<sup>14</sup> which belongs in the context of an argument similar to the one presented at PSV V 3, where Dignāga cites the original version to substantiate his criticism.

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Mallavādin was using this work in his presentation of Dignāga's arguments, which are also presented in PSV V although in an abbreviated form.

<sup>11</sup> The title also occurs in verse two of the Chinese fragment.

<sup>12</sup> See *Translation* n. 182.

<sup>13</sup> See *Translation* n. 182.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. 2.28 below.

**2.5** Dignāga apparently wrote similar extensive studies like, for instance, *Nyāyaparīkṣā*, which is referred to in later philosophical literature as *mahatī*,<sup>15</sup> “comprehensive.” It is uncertain if the *Dvādaśaśatikā* which presupposes the *apoha* theory belongs among Dignāga’s pre-PSV works like the SPVy. It must have been considered an important Dignāga *oeuvre* because Dharmakīrti quotes a short prose passage from it in PVSV.<sup>16</sup> The significance of the title “The twelve hundred” is uncertain. It may refer to the number of verses (*kārikās*) of the work. As only a prose passage is quoted, it may have been a work of considerable size, consisting of *kārikās* embedded in a prose commentary like other Indian philosophical literature. It is regrettable that Dignāga’s works on epistemology and logic are no longer extant, as the somewhat truncated discourse of PSV contains very little information on contemporary scholars, whose works and philosophical doctrines Dignāga addresses in PSV.

**2.6** Fortunately PSV has survived the ravages of time albeit in two mediocre Tibetan versions and a few Sanskrit fragments. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the main reason, why PSV is still extant although in Tibetan translation, is because its relative brevity made it an ideal work to comment on for generations of post-Dignāga Buddhist philosophers, who could use it as a pretext for introducing views of later philosophers as if they were Dignāga’s own, while not addressing views that had become controversial or out of date in the context of post-Dignāga philosophy. For instance, Jinendrabuddhi refrains deliberately from addressing the implications of Dignāga’s use of the term *arthāntaranivṛtṭiviśiṣṭa*,<sup>17</sup> “qualified by the preclusion of other referents,” which, according to Dignāgan epistemology, distinguishes the referents (*bhāva*) of any word from the referents of other words. However, the evidence indicates that Dignāga introduced this term, since he conceived *anyāpoha* as a substitute for real universals, as opposed

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* 142,13–15: *mahatyāṃ Nyāyaparīkṣāyāṃ ... ācārya-Dignā-gapādaiḥ*.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Pind 1991: 269 n. 1.

<sup>17</sup> See *Translation* n. 466.

to his non-Buddhist contemporaries, who regarded real universals as qualifiers of things and thus as *pravṛttinimitta* of denotation.

**2.7** Whatever may have been the cause, a substantial part of Dignāga's work is irretrievably lost, and PSV V is the only extant exposition of his philosophy of language. Since Jinendrabuddhi does not identify the scholars whose views Dignāga rejects in this chapter, it is difficult to place PSV V in a well-defined historical context. Dignāga's *apoha* theory was known among contemporary thinkers before he wrote the fifth chapter of PSV V because he addresses the *sāṅkhyanāśaka*<sup>18</sup> philosopher Mādhava's criticism of the *apoha* doctrine in a fairly long and difficult section of PSV V 39ff.<sup>19</sup> Dignāga's answer includes slightly edited quotations of Mādhava's critical remarks.<sup>20</sup> Fortunately Jinendrabuddhi provides the Sanskrit original of Dignāga's source, although he does not mention its title. Mādhava evidently criticized the *apoha* theory as presented in another work by Dignāga, presumably the no longer extant SPVy, and Dignāga answers his criticism in PSV V. In the same context Dignāga also answers a Jaina philosopher's critical remarks about his *apoha* thesis at PSV V 41. Jinendrabuddhi quotes the relevant passage from his work, but he does not mention its title or the name of its author, who is styled *vaibhāṅika* "distinctionist." This section is especially crucial for understanding Dignāga's *apoha* thesis as it shows unambiguously that his theory of exclusion pivots on non-existence (*abhāva*) of other things in the locus of any referent, namely their mutual non-existence, which Dignāga appears to regard as a general qualifier like real general properties.

### **Dignāga's presentation of the *apoha* doctrine in PSV V**

**2.8** Dignāga's presentation in PSV V of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy of language is marked by tantalizing ellipsis and appears

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<sup>18</sup> See PSV<sub>5</sub> I 17: *sāṅkhyanāśako mādhas tv āha*.

<sup>19</sup> Dignāga mentions Mādhava's views on *pratyakṣa* in the Sāṅkhya section of PSV I; cf. PSV I 28, PSV<sub>5</sub> I 17; Hattori 1968, *Translation* p. 57f.

<sup>20</sup> Mādhava's knowledge of the *apoha* theory necessitates re-thinking his and Dignāga's dates.

to be remarkably lax, which affects understanding the philosophy of *anyāpoha*. Important theoretical statements are restricted to a few highly condensed paragraphs of the entire chapter, which is primarily concerned with refuting contemporary theories of meaning based on the assumption that the semantic condition of the application of words are real universals inherent in things. In contrast to other chapters of PSV, Dignāga does not attempt to present or justify in any detail his own view on the subject of *apoha* in the first part of the chapter, which is primarily devoted to criticizing doctrines that Dignāga rejects as untenable. In fact, crucial statements about *anyāpoha* are only presented at PSV V 34–50, the final third of PSV V. The fifth chapter starts by presenting the thesis that verbal knowledge does not differ from inference, as any word like “existing” (*sat*) denotes its referent by excluding other referents in the same way as the logical indicator “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*), which presupposes that there be invariable connection (*avinābhāvasambandha*) between the word and its referent similar to that of the inferential indicator (*liṅga, hetu*) and the indicated. Dignāga continues immediately thereafter by criticizing in some detail views he rejects as untenable. The identities of most of the philosophers whose theses Dignāga analyses and confounds remain unknown, as Jinendra-buddhi rarely identifies any of Dignāga’s protagonists.

**2.9** Thus the exact philosophical context of the relentless criticism which Dignāga levels at the philosophy of language of contemporary philosophers remains obscure, except when he answers the criticism of the *apoha* doctrine formulated by the Sāṃkhya philosopher Mādhava (see 2.7). In general the order of presentation of the philosophical issues discussed in the chapter does not appear to be well organised as many of the subjects under discussion appear to be addressed haphazardly. This no doubt reflects Dignāga’s attempt to summarize, in the fifth chapter, the content of the more comprehensive work, SPVy, and possibly to address reactions to his major work. Important concepts are sometimes introduced abruptly without explaining their connection to the context in which they are introduced. This has left a noticeable mark of lack of coherence on the discourse of this crucial chapter. For instance, it is not clear why Dignāga addresses the semantics of compounds in the light of the general *apoha* thesis immediately after



the first central section PSV V 1–13, although the analysis of the relation between the terms of a compound like *nīlotpala* is no doubt motivated by the attempt to analyse the semantic relation between general and particular terms in the context of the *apoha* theory, which in a way mirrors the relation between the terms of a sentence (*vākya*).

**2.10** The first part of PSV V 1–11 (+12–13), however, is a well-defined and independent section of the chapter. In this section Dignāga analyses and rejects four theories of denotation: That a general term denotes (1) individuals (*bheda*), (2) general properties (*jāti*), (3) the connection between general properties and the thing in which they inhere (*tadyoga*), and (4) the general property possessor (*tadvat*). It ends with the claim that the thesis that a word excludes other referents is settled (*\*sthitam*), although no formal proof has been presented to substantiate the claim. It would thus seem that the untenability of the rejected views serves as a means of bolstering the *apoha* doctrine through *via negationis*. Although Dignāga presents a fairly detailed analysis of the last mentioned theory, he never addresses this thesis again, except in the important paragraphs at PSV V 34–36 which present a brief account of why the problems of the four theses analysed at PSV V 2–4a do not obtain according to the *apoha* thesis. For instance, the main problem of the *tadvat* thesis, namely the impossibility of direct (*sākṣāt*) reference, is briefly mentioned at PSV V 36c, where Dignāga claims that the *apoha* thesis does not entail this problem, since exclusion of other referents applies directly (*sākṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhāt*).

**2.11** However, the immediately following *kārikās* at PSV V 12–13 introduce subjects that have not been addressed previously in the chapter and in one case only once in the entire treatise. For instance, the implication of the concept of *svasambandhānurūpya* introduced at PS V 12 is explained in a theoretically charged passage at PSV II 13, which is the only passage of the entire PSV where it occurs. It is obvious that the two verses must have been copied from another of Dignāga's works – perhaps the SPVy – in which the implication of the term was treated in detail and its denotation explained. There are also noticeable inconsistencies in the chapter that are difficult to understand. For instance, the fairly long exposition at PSV 25–30 explains that exclusion of other

referents is caused by conflict or opposition (*virodha*) between properties occurring in a tree of categories and the terms that denote them. The tree presupposes a logically ordered hierarchy of properties, which ultimately is derived from Vaiśeṣika taxonomy.

**2.12** But Dignāga apparently invalidates *virodha* as cause of exclusion at PSV V 31a by introducing non-observation (*adr̥ṣṭa*) as a justifiable substitute, and explains at PSV V 34 that mere non-observation (*adarśanamātra*) of any given word's application to things other than its own referent establishes exclusion and verbal knowledge as inference. This discussion together with the following paragraphs at PSV V 35–36 are the only passages specifically devoted to presenting the philosophy of *apoha*. Dignāga apparently did not attempt to integrate the two mutually incompatible causes of exclusion into a logically coherent theory, and the crucial paragraphs PSV V 34–36 only present the bare essentials of his *apoha* theory leaving a number of important philosophical issues unanswered.

**2.13** Other information that is essential to our understanding of the rationale of the *apoha* doctrine is mentioned incidentally, for instance, the crucial information that the general property of any given referent or word that is defined as exclusion of other referents or words is located *in* the referent (*arthe*) or *in* the word (*śabde*). Since the evidence shows that *anyāpoha* pivots on exclusion interpreted as non-existence or negation (*abhāva*) of other referents (*artha*) or other words (*śabda*) in any given referent or word, it raises a number of intriguing questions about what justifies exclusion: *apoha* is evidently not related to negation in its well-established Western sense because ultimately the *apoha* theory is not centred on the notion of negation as the act of denying a word or statement, but rather on the notion of non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent of any word (see 6.1 ff). Dignāga conceived *anyāpoha* as a qualifier of the referent of the word, evidently imitating contemporary usage among Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers. The introduction of the locative to denote the referents of the word as loci of *anyāpoha* would otherwise be incomprehensible: *anyāpoha* is presented as qualifying the referent as if it were a real general property, which is corroborated by Dignāga's use of the

locative to designate the referent as locus of *anyāpoha*, which is understandable with the background of Dignāga's statement at PSV V 36d that exclusion of other referents has all the acknowledged properties of a general property (*jāti*).

## The title of PSV V

**2.14** The Tibetan translation of PSV V attributed to Vasudhararakṣita and Señ rgyal (hence V),<sup>21</sup> reproduces the title of the fifth chapter as *tshad ma kun las btus pa las gžan sel ba brtag pa'i le'u ste lña pa'o*. This would indicate that the original Sanskrit title of the chapter was *\*anyāpohaparīkṣā*. The question is whether it is rightly so named. In fact, the Tibetan version attributed to Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab (hence K) does not record any title, but merely refers to the chapter as "the fifth chapter" (*le'u lña pa'o*). Unfortunately the Sanskrit colophon of the fifth chapter of PST is missing. Its Tibetan translation, however, corroborates K by reading *le'u lña pa'o* (= *\*pañcamah paricchedaḥ*). As Ms B of PST V omits the colophon we are forced to restore its title by extrapolating from the colophon of chapters like that of the first one, which reads *prathamah paricchedaḥ (samāptah)*.<sup>22</sup>

**2.15** PSV V is, of course, a *parīkṣā* in the sense that it analyses and refutes views which Dignāga considers untenable, but it is certainly not a critical examination of *anyāpoha*. This would contradict the purpose of the chapter, which is to justify why exclusion of other words and speech units or other referents does not entail the problems that follow from the assumption that real general properties inherent in words and speech units or things constitute the semantic condition of denotation. Originally individual chapters of PSV did not bear any title, as indicated by the translation of PSV attributed to Kanakavarman

<sup>21</sup> K appears to have been completed in the 11th or by the beginning of the 12th century A.D. and V towards the end of the 11th century A.D. See Mejoy 1991: 179.

<sup>22</sup> The Tibetan version of PST V does not corroborate the reading *samāptah* which may be an interpolation. It is occasionally found in contemporary colophons, but it is evidently redundant.

and his collaborator. Their translation of PSV merely enumerates the number of the individual chapters, in contrast to the version attributed to Vasudhararakṣita and his assistant, which adds information about the number and subject matter of the first three chapters, namely PSV I *\*pratyakṣa* (*mñon sum gyi le'u ste dan po'o*),<sup>23</sup> PSV II *\*svārthānumāna* (*rañ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste le'u gñis pa'o*),<sup>24</sup> and PSV III *\*parārthānumāna* (*gžan gyi don rjes su dpag pa'i le'u*), adding the term *\*parīkṣā* (*brtag pa*) after the title of the remaining three chapters like those of PSV IV *\*dṛṣṭāntadṛṣṭāntābhāsaparīkṣā* (*dpe dan dpe ltar snañ ba brtag pa'i le'u ste bži pa'o*),<sup>25</sup> PSV V *\*anyāpohaparīkṣā* (*gžan sel ba brtag pa'i le'u ste lha pa'o*), and PSV VI *\*jātiparīkṣā* (*lhag gcod brtag pa'i le'u ste drug pa'o*).<sup>26</sup> Since the title *\*anyāpohaparīkṣā* is only recorded in V, it is reasonable to conclude that the Sanskrit title *\*anyāpohaparīkṣā* is spurious, and in all likelihood so are the titles of PSV IV and VI. It is impossible to decide why the term *parīkṣā* was added to the colophons of the last three chapters.

## The format of PSV V

**2.16** The format of the two Tibetan translations of PSV V reflects well established classical Indian literary standards. It consists formally of 49½ *kārikās* embedded in a prose commentary. Oddly, in both K and V verse 43 only consists of two *pādas* as opposed to the well-established pattern of four *pādas* to a *śloka*, which Tibetan translators reproduce as four times seven syllables. The reason for this anomaly is unknown as the Tibetan versions of PSV V and the separate version of the verses included in the *bsTan 'gyur*<sup>27</sup> do not imply that originally verse 43 consisted of just two *pādas* as one would expect, nor that the identification or numbering of the verses of PSV V is wrong if compared to the order and number of the verses of PSV in general.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. P 27b6.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. P 42b7.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. P 70a8.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. P 93a8.

<sup>27</sup> The separate version of the verses is extracted from K and is therefore without independent value.

**2.17** As Jinendrabuddhi's explanation indicates the two *pādas* of verse 43 are introduced by slightly edited quotations from the source Dignāga criticizes; and there is nothing that indicates that K and V in this particular instance misinterpreted two *pādas* as prose, which otherwise might explain the apparent irregularity. In view of this peculiar problem it is noticeable that the translators of V interpreted the sentence that closes PSV V 3 as two *ślokapādas*: /'di yi rigs kyi sgra yis ni // brjod par bya ba ñid mi 'thad / which reads in the Sanskrit phrase that closes the paragraph: *naivāśya jātiśabdena* </> *vācyatvam upapadyate*. If this interpretation is correct, and it is certainly metrically possible, it would solve the riddle of the two missing *pādas* of PSV V 43.<sup>28</sup> The distribution of the two hundred *pādas* among the fifty *kārikās* merely has to be adjusted accordingly,<sup>29</sup> that is, *pādas* 4ab are to be converted to 4bc, and so on, and *pādas* 43ab to 43bc.

### The Tibetan translations of PSV V

**2.18** The two Tibetan translations of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti* are maddeningly difficult as they are peppered with textual problems of every kind conceivable. Many sentences are extremely difficult to construe, and so far scholars have been forced to study PSV V supported by the generally excellent Tibetan version of Jinendrabuddhi's PST V included in the *bsTan 'gyur* and published in Hattori 1982. Thus the problem of construing the two Tibetan renderings of PSV V is a major obstacle to understanding Dignāga's thought.

**2.19** Although K as a rule appears to be more reliable than V, there are nonetheless passages that make better sense in the version recorded in V, whose translation occasionally is corroborated by the Sanskrit sources as opposed to that of K. Indeed, at the present juncture of Dignāga studies there appears to be no justification for preferring one version to the other. Only when the two Tibetan versions of PSV have been studied carefully in the light of the information of the presumably original Sanskrit version of PSV that can be restored on the basis of PST will

<sup>28</sup> See *Translation* n. [15] n. (4).

<sup>29</sup> See *Translation* n. [15] n. (4).

it be possible to decide which of the two versions is more trustworthy than the other, and, last but not least, to determine to what extent the occasional differences between the two Tibetan translations of Dignāga's work are attributable to different versions of it or just illegible Sanskrit manuscripts (see 2.21–32), rather than to translation mistakes or mere differences of interpretation of the syntax and vocabulary of the Sanskrit original.

**2.20** The erratic and occasionally nonsensical character of K or V would indicate that the two translator teams may not have had sufficient expertise in Indian or Dignāgan philosophy of logic and language. It is hard to believe, however, that insufficient knowledge of Dignāga's philosophy would explain the tantalizing difficulties of reading the translators' efforts as not all passages of K and V present similar obstacles. This makes one wonder if there may have been other reasons for the inferior quality of their translations than mere incompetence.

**2.21** Vasudhararakṣita is only credited with the translation of PSV, so it is impossible to ascertain whether he was a poorly educated scholar in the field of Indian philosophy. Kanakavarman, on the other hand, is credited with the excellent revision of the Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*,<sup>30</sup> which is a demanding treatise to translate into Tibetan; in addition he also produced a superb Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*.<sup>31</sup> He can hardly be considered incompetent. Even if the two translators were not specialists of classical Indian epistemology and logic, we must assume that they would be able to construe Dignāga's Sanskrit *kārikās* and prose, which in general is comparatively simple and devoid of syntactical complexities of the kind we encounter in, for instance, the contemporary grammarian Bhartṛhari's prose, which Dignāga knew and in a few cases exploited.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. Louis de la Vallée Poussin's preface to his edition of *Madhyamakāvatāra*, cf. La Vallée Poussin 1970.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Mejer 1991: 178.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. e.g. PSV V 46; Pind 2003.

**2.22** It is impossible to explain the poor quality of the Tibetan translations unless one assumes that somehow it reflects the two translator teams' inability correctly to interpret the readings of their Sanskrit manuscripts. It is therefore noteworthy that Kanakavarman or Vasudhararakṣita misinterpreted words and phrases, which should not present any difficulty of interpretation to scholars with traditional Indian background, provided that the Sanskrit manuscripts were readable. Indeed, the evidence supports the conclusion that the difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations are at least to some extent due to the translators' attempt to render Sanskrit corruptions into Tibetan, even if the readings were meaningless and the Tibetan translations in consequence incomprehensible.

**2.23** For instance, the reading at PSV II 4d: *śugs kyis K : don yod pa'i V*<sup>33</sup> is utterly incomprehensible. *śugs kyis* sometimes reproduces Sanskrit *arthāpattyā*, which regularly is translated as *don gyi śugs kyis*. However, the translator team responsible for V could not identify the last word of the compound, which they may have interpreted as a form of Sanskrit *sattā* as the Tibetan term *yod* would indicate. However, the Tibetan term *don* which is commonly used to translate Sanskrit *artha* shows that the first word of the compound was easy for them to identify, which thus corroborates the suggested Sanskrit restoration *\*arthāpattyā*.

**2.24** Kanakavarman and his assistant must have read the noun phrase *tadvān artho* at PS V 9c as if the reading were *\*tadvad artho* because they reproduce it as *de ltar don*. The Tibetan translation *de ltar* presupposes a regular sandhi form of the Sanskrit adverb *\*tadvat* before vowel. The Tibetan translation is, of course, incomprehensible in the context, and one can only conclude from examples like this, of which unfortunately there are several instances, that indigenous Tibetan scholars and students of Indian logic and epistemology were ill served by the Tibetan translations of PSV that eventually were included in the Tibetan *bsTan 'gyur*.

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 2.

**2.25** Fortunately, the Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* makes it possible to identify the causes of some of the translation mistakes. The Sanskrit evidence indicates that one of them was the not uncommon problem of disjoining morphemes in the process of copying. However, without the original Sanskrit sources the causes of such errors are difficult to detect.

**2.26** A characteristic example of a translation based upon Sanskrit text with disjoined morphemes is Vasudhararakṣita and his collaborator's reproduction of the term *ūrdhvatāvat* at PSV V 31d. The Tibetan translation *re žig greñ ba la* presupposes apparently a reading like *\*ūrdhve tāvat*, which is meaningless in the context. Although Tibetan translators are not known to make conjectures, one cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that the translation *greñ ba la* which would seem to presuppose Sanskrit *\*ūrdhve*, is, in fact, an emendation intended to correct the false reading *ūrdhva tāvat*, which any translator with knowledge of Sanskrit would consider dubious and perhaps attempt to "correct."

**2.27** In any case, one should not overlook the fact that Tibetan translators tend to translate what they read in their Sanskrit manuscripts and do not attempt to make conjectures or emendations. Thus some of the apparent absurdities of the Tibetan translations of V and K stem in the final analysis from PSV manuscripts that were carelessly or badly copied and therefore difficult to interpret. The vagaries of the transmission of the original Sanskrit version of PSV are in places evident. For instance, K and V concur in not translating into Tibetan the crucial apodosis required by the context at PSV V 32d: *tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya prayogaḥ sambhavati*. This clause, however, was evidently part of Dignāga's original text, as Jinendrabuddhi incorporated it into his paraphrase of the paragraph he was commenting on.<sup>34</sup> This indicates that the otherwise divergent manuscripts used by the two translator teams descend from an archetype in which this particular sentence was missing. There is no doubt, however, that the phrase was an integral part of the original version of PSV V 32d as Dignāga's exposition

<sup>34</sup> Cf. PST Ms B 225a2 quoted ad loc.



would be incomprehensible without it. In addition, there are no quotable examples in PSV V of phrases beginning with *yadā* that are not syntactically followed by the corresponding apodosis of *tadā*.

**2.28** Some passages appear to reproduce corruptions like PSV V 33d, which is impossible to construe in the versions presented in K and V. The readings *yod pa la sogs par* K : *sogs par* V translate in all likelihood \**śatrantāḍau* as Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* indicates. The translator team responsible for K, however, could not identify the first term of the compound correctly, but apparently read it as *sattā* + *āḍau*, the translation not leaving any trace whatsoever of the term *anta*. The scholars credited with V apparently could not even identify the word *śatranta*, although they correctly identified the last word of the compound as the locative of *ādi*. With this background the student of the Tibetan version of PST V 33d, which correctly reproduces and comments upon the passage, will find it impossible to identify the context of the discussion, much less understand the argument presented at PSV V 33d. The few examples cited above – they are not isolated instances – show the type of philological problems that students of the Tibetan translations of PSV have to resolve in order to make sense of Dignāga's text.

**2.29** There are sometimes considerable differences between the Tibetan translations and the Sanskrit evidence of PST, which shows that the manuscript transmission of PSV is not uniform. In contrast to minor differences between K and V with regard to translation of individual verses of PSV V, their versions of PSV V 2c–d differ in several respects. For instance, only V reproduces Dignāga's quotation of Bhartrhari's VP III 14.8. This citation, however, is essential to Dignāga's argument and crucial for understanding it; and it is not clear why it is not found in K. Jinendrabuddhi does not explain its implications, which is remarkable as he usually addresses grammatical issues. This would indicate that he did not find it in his copy of PSV V, assuming that he would check the original source when writing his *Ṭīkā*. Dignāga, however, quotes the Bhartrhari verse in support of his argument, and we have no reason to assume that it was interpolated because parallels in works by Dignāga's opponents show that the verse belongs in the context of this particular argument. Uddyotakara cites an edited version of the same

verse addressing a similar argument in his criticism of Dignāga's *apoha* theory. It stems in all likelihood from Dignāga's no longer extant SPVy.

**2.30** In a few instances the difference between K and V is inexplicable, unless we assume that the Tibetan versions presuppose different readings and not just corrupt text or misinterpretations. For instance, the Tibetan conversions of the paragraph that follows immediately after PSV V 3 are mutually divergent and incompatible with the Sanskrit evidence of PST Ms B 195a1ff. Thus the term *āśaṃkitam* at PST Ms B 195a6 and the phrase *idaṃ tad iti* recorded at PST Ms B 195b1 have no identifiable translations in K or V, although Jinendrabuddhi's exegesis indicates that he quotes the source he is explaining. I have therefore adopted the Sanskrit readings of PST as I think that they are preferable to the confused translations of K and V, although neither K nor V corroborate the readings presented in PST.

**2.31** In other cases the translators appear to have rendered glosses interpolated into the verses, as it is sometimes impossible to fit the terms reproduced in the Tibetan translation of a particular verse into the metrical constraints of a Sanskrit *śloka* of thirty two syllables. For instance, the Tibetan translation of PSV V 48a–d contains the compound *ñag gi don V* : *ñag don K*, evidently rendering Sanskrit *\*vākyārtha*. However, it is impossible to fit *\*vākyārtha* into the Sanskrit restoration with the background of the readings of the verse recorded in PST V. *\*vākyārtha* is probably a marginal gloss introduced as a synonym of *pratibhā* (f.) in order to explain the reference of the demonstrative pronoun *sā* (f.) at 48a. As the Tibetan equivalent of Sanskrit *vākyārtha* is found in both K and V, which represent different manuscript transmissions of PSV, it is possible to conclude that the term was interpolated into the verse of the Sanskrit original or perhaps earlier Tibetan attempts to translate Dignāga's work before the translations recorded in K and V were executed.

**2.32** There are noteworthy divergences between K and V with regard to which *ślokas* are *saṃgrahaślokas*. In PSV *saṃgrahaślokas* occur sparingly and they invariably summarize issues treated in the preceding paragraphs. However, in Vasudhararakṣita's translation of PSV V 12–13

the two verses are designated as *\*saṃgrahaśloka*s, despite the fact that they do not summarize the preceding exposition, but quite unexpectedly introduce entirely new topics.<sup>35</sup> In K, on the other hand, they are rendered as ordinary *śloka*s. Similarly, the two verses at PSV V 26–27 are *saṃgrahaśloka*s according to V, although they do not summarize the content of the preceding paragraphs, but rather add some general remarks about the logico-semantic relation between general terms. K does not identify the verses as *saṃgrahaśloka*s, nor does Jinendrabuddhi in any way suggest that they are inserted in order to summarize the content of the preceding discussion. The conclusion is inevitable: These stylistic qualifications were added at a later time. They were inserted for no obvious reason as the nature of Dignāga's exposition does not *per se* qualify them as *saṃgrahaśloka*s.

**2.33** Thus the evidence indicates that corruptions of the Sanskrit manuscripts of PSV no doubt are one of the main causes of the difficulties of understanding Dignāga's thought through the Tibetan translations of PSV. When all the linguistic information contained in PST has been studied with the background of the Tibetan translations of K and V we shall be in a much better position to ascertain whether or not the many philological problems of the two versions, which force any scholar into hairsplitting arguments *pro et contra* regarding possible solutions to almost insoluble philological problems, are caused by textual corruptions of the original Sanskrit manuscripts, which the translators attempted to render into Tibetan, or just random instances of incompetence on their part. Even the highly competent Tibetan translator of PST, dPañ lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa, occasionally produced passages that are entirely incomprehensible in the context of the subject matter because he faithfully translated a string of corruptions exactly as he read and interpreted them. In one case he even appears to have made a conjecture, although it is meaningless in the context.<sup>36</sup> Finally, it is

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<sup>35</sup> Cf. e.g. *Translation* n. 188.

<sup>36</sup> For instance, the Tibetan translation of PST Ms B 211a1 which quotes PS V 46, is incomprehensible because Blo gros brtan pa reproduced text that is full of corruptions and in principle untranslatable. For instance PST loc. cit. reads *apodvāre* for *apoddhāre*, which Blo gros brtan pa translated as

necessary to investigate whether the occasional textual divergences between the Tibetan translations of PSV and the readings quoted in the Sanskrit manuscript of PST reflect actual differences of transmission of Dignāga's work and not chance corruptions or interpolations.

### 3 *Viśālāmalavatī Tīkā* V and the commentator Jinendrabuddhi

**3.1** The *Viśālāmalavatī Tīkā* attributed to Jinendrabuddhi is the only extant commentary on Dignāga's PSV. As I shall show below, PST is not the only commentary devoted to commenting upon PSV. The evidence indicates that it is dependent upon other sources, some of which were known to Dignāga's critics Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri (see 4.13), who quote them in their criticism of Dignāga's logic and *apoha* thesis. This makes Jinendrabuddhi's work an important source of information not only on the Sanskrit text of Dignāga's work, as it makes it possible to restore substantial sections of PSV V, but also to some extent on the nature of the earlier commentaries devoted to explaining PSV and the philosophical issues Dignāga discusses throughout his work.

**3.2** Jinendrabuddhi is in all likelihood identical with Nyāsakāra, the author of *Nyāsa*, an important commentary on the *Kāśikā* known as the *Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjikā*. The date of the Nyāsakāra has been the subject of continuous debate. Consensus is that the reference to *Nyāsa* in Māgha's *Śiśupālavadha* is indeed to Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the *Kāśikā*; and therefore it is likely that Jinendrabuddhi was active as a scholar around 700 A.D.<sup>37</sup> Since he quotes *Tattvasaṅgraha* verses 1241, 1263, and 2811 in PST I pp. 43 and 54, Jinendrabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788 A.D.) must have been contemporaries. Since Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla refer to Jinendrabuddhi's view of *pratyakṣa* as shown by Funayama,<sup>38</sup> he may therefore have been an older contemporary of this eminent Buddhist scholar. Thus it is reasonable

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*sel ba'i sgo la* as if the reading of the Sanskrit Ms was *apohadvāre*. He apparently conjectured that *apo* was a mistake for *apoha*. See *Translation* n. 221.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. the discussion in Cardona 1980: 280–281.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Funayama 1999.

to assume that he was active as a writer in the first half of 8th century A.D. Apparently Jinendrabuddhi does not quote *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (hence TSP). This would indicate that copies of Kamalaśīla's TSP may not yet have been in circulation among Buddhist philosophers before Jinendrabuddhi composed PST.

**3.3** Jinendrabuddhi was evidently conversant with the sources addressed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, as appears from the discussion in TSP and PST V of Kumāṛila's criticism of the Dignāga's view that verbal communication is subject to the constraints of the logical canon of *trairūpya*.<sup>39</sup> However, the treatment recorded in PST V differs from that of TSP, which therefore may not have been known to Jinendrabuddhi. The source that Kamalaśīla and Jinendrabuddhi address criticizes the theory that the inferential nature of verbal communication consists in its indicating the intention of the speaker. This view was presented by Dharmakīrti, and the unknown source specifically subjects Dharmakīrti's view to criticism. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla address the criticism of Dharmakīrti's view in the context of Kumāṛila's critique of the assumption that verbal communication is subject to the constraints of the *trairūpya*. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the source which Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla address may be Kumāṛila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā*,<sup>40</sup> which unfortunately has never been recovered.

**3.4** The colophons of PST and *Nyāsa* refer to Jinendrabuddhi as "Bodhisattvadeśīya." As the copyist of PST supports this attribution by honouring Jinendrabuddhi as an erudite grammarian, there is no cogent reason for doubting that the colophons refer to the same author.<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, it is difficult to corroborate the attribution of PST and *Nyāsa* to the same person on the basis of internal evidence. It is evident, though, that the author of PST was an expert in Sanskrit grammatical literature, as appears from his concise explanation of Dignāga's

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<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Appendix 2*.

<sup>40</sup> For the sources of this discussion, cf. *Appendix 2*.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. PST I, *Introduction* p. xxxii foll.; *Nyāsa* VI 670.

quotation at PSV V 9ab of a well-known grammatical definition – allegedly from Bhartr̥hari’s *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā* – of the semantic conditions for introducing the abstract affixes *tā* and *tva*, which are claimed to denote either the relation (*sambandha*) or general property (*jāti*).<sup>42</sup> One would therefore assume that Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis of A V 1.119 defining the semantics of the abstract affixes would quote and comment upon the same crucial definition of their usage, as does Kaiyaṭa, who quotes and explains it in his MBhP on A V 1.119.

**3.5** The Nyāsakāra evidently knew the above-mentioned definition as he quotes it elsewhere in the *Nyāsa*.<sup>43</sup> However, he limits himself to the barest essentials when commenting on A V 1.119, although he mentions the view of some who claim that the cause of application of speech units denoting an action is the relation (*sambandha*) between the action and the agent of that action (*kecit tu kriyākāraśambandhaṃ kriyāśabdānāṃ pravṛttinimittam icchanti*). The thesis that speech units denote *sambandha* is mentioned by Dignāga at PSV I 3d. The example of such *kriyāśabdā* is *pācakatva*, which illustrates the rule that the introduction of the abstract affix after *pācaka* serves the purpose of denoting the relation. Jinendrabuddhi presents a concise exegesis of Dignāga’s quotation of the grammatical definition that in essence is similar to the one found in Kaiyaṭa’s MBhP on MBh explaining A V 1.119, although Jinendrabuddhi mentions additional instances of compounds (*samāsa*), and *kṛt* and *taddhita* derivatives. The only instance that would corroborate the alleged identity of the Nyāsakāra and Jinendrabuddhi is the remarkable similarity between Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis of A II 1.57 and his exegesis of PSV V 14 and 27.<sup>44</sup>

**3.6** The writer Bhāmaha, author of *Kāvyaṭīkā*, a well-known treatise on poetics, refers to some Nyāsakāra at *Kāvyaṭīkā* VI 36 where Bhāmaha rejects the Nyāsakāra’s description of a particular type of compound formation as contradicting Pāṇini’s grammar. The question

<sup>42</sup> See, for instance, Chakravarti 1930: 207ff (with n. 3.).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Nyāsa* I 610,28–29; *Translation* n. [40].

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *Translation*, n.s 202 and 356.

is whether the Nyāsakāra, whose view Bhāmaha rejects, is identical with Jinendrabuddhi, the author of *Nyāsa*. Bhāmaha mentions the word *vrtrahanṭṛ* as an example of a term accepted by the Nyāsakāra, although it is excluded by the relevant Pāṇinian rules. In this connection Bhāmaha refers to A III 1.133, which introduces the affix *ṭṛc* to denote the agent of an action, and A II 2.15, which disallows the introduction of this affix to form a genitive *tatpuruṣa* (*śaṣṭhītatpuruṣa*) compound like *vrtrahanṭṛ*. This compound, however, is recorded in the *Mahābhārata*;<sup>45</sup> and post-Pāṇinian grammarians tried to accommodate the Pāṇinian rules to recorded usage. But nowhere does *Nyāsa* mention *vrtrahanṭṛ* together with other non-Pāṇinian compounds as examples of legitimate derivations under the Sanskrit grammarians' attempt at accommodating the linguistic evidence to the relevant Pāṇinian rules.<sup>46</sup> We are evidently faced with another Nyāsakāra, several of whom are mentioned in Sanskrit grammatical literature, among others by Bhartṛhari in his *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā*.<sup>47</sup>

**3.7** The date of Bhāmaha has been the subject of a never-ending debate. G. Tucci, for instance, concluded on the basis of references to Dignāga's philosophy in *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, that Bhāmaha must have been a pre-Dharmakīrti scholar because he does not mention Dharmakīrti's philosophy anywhere.<sup>48</sup> This is certainly true. The question is whether the absence of references to Dharmakīrti's works corroborates the conclusion as it is based upon an argument *e silentio*. The evidence, however, supports Tucci's conclusion. Indeed, Bhāmaha must have been either a pre-Dharmakīrti writer or one of Dharmakīrti's contemporaries as Dharmakīrti addresses his criticism of Dignāga's *apoha* theory at PVSV 63,12ff. This conclusion is corroborated by Jinendrabuddhi's presentation of Dharmakīrti's views on *anyāpoha* in an excursus inserted immediately after his comment on PSV V 13.<sup>49</sup> In this excursus

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Petersburger Wörterbuch s.v.

<sup>46</sup> For a recent discussion of the evidence, cf. *Kāvyālaṅkāra*.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Cardona 1980: n. 453.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Tucci 1930: 142–147.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *Appendix 3*.

Jinendrabuddhi quotes a slightly edited version of Bhāmaha's objection to Dignāga's *apoha* theory at *Kāvyālaṅkāra* VI 17, which states that according to the *apoha* theory a word must have two separate functions, namely that of affirmation and that of exclusion.

**3.8** In Jinendrabuddhi's exposition this objection is followed by a quotation of Dharmakīrti's PVSV 63,12ff, which he interprets as Dharmakīrti's answer to Bhāmaha's objection. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand why Jinendrabuddhi would quote a slightly edited version of *Kāvyālaṅkāra* VI 17 in this particular context. The above-mentioned passage of PVSV addresses among other issues Dharmakīrti's statement at PV I 127ab: *na cāpi śabdo dvayakṛd anyonyābhāva ity asau* that a word does not effect two things viz. affirmation and exclusion – which reproduces Bhāmaha's objection to Dignāga's *apoha* thesis, since the connection between the referent posited by the word and the thing excluded is one of mutual non-existence; and affirmation implies *per se* negation which merely reflects non-existence of one of the elements of the relation of mutual non-existence.

**3.9** Jinendrabuddhi's identification of the target of Dharmakīrti's argument as Bhāmaha is not an isolated instance in post-Dharmakīrti philosophical literature. Other contemporary scholars like Śāntarakṣita, who quotes Bhāmaha's objection at TS 911, show a marked dependence on Dharmakīrti's rejection of Bhāmaha's criticism when presenting at TS 1019 his own refutation of Bhāmaha's arguments. This corroborates Jinendrabuddhi's identification of the target of Dharmakīrti's criticism with Bhāmaha. Moreover, Karṇakagomin quotes in PVSVṬ 250,19–22 the relevant verses from *Kāvyālaṅkāra* followed by the observation that Bhāmaha's claim is rejected by Dharmakīrti's argument at PVSV 63,12ff, which both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla at TSP 395,18 take to address Bhāmaha's objection to the *apoha* theory.<sup>50</sup> With this observation I think we can safely put the debate about Bhāmaha's date to rest.

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. the evidence traced in *Appendix 3*.



## The sources of *Viśālāmalavatī* V

**3.10** The impression one gets from reading Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* is that he rewrote older material with the intention of making his own *Ṭīkā au courant* with the latest development in epistemology, logic and philosophy of language. Jinendrabuddhi's dependence on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, which contains an important section devoted to the philosophy of *anyāpoha*, is evident throughout his commentary on PSV V. Thus, PST V reflects Dharmakīrti's position in the process of explaining Dignāga's *apoha* thesis. Consequently Jinendrabuddhi is not a reliable exegete of Dignāga's thought in every respect. His main objective is evidently to show that Dignāga's views are compatible with Dharmakīrti's philosophy. This attempt makes him gloss over controversial aspects of Dignāga's philosophy.

**3.11** For instance, Dharmakīrti attempts to re-interpret the rationale of Dignāga's claim that words denote things (*bhāva*) or entities (*va-stu*) qualified by exclusion or absence of other things from the referent in the light of his own philosophy;<sup>51</sup> and he re-interprets Dignāga's claim that verbal cognition does not differ from inference; according to Dharmakīrti's interpretation, the inferential nature of verbal cognition means that the thing inferred is not the referent of the verbal expression, as Dignāga claims, but the *vivakṣā* of the speaker, whose intention is inferable through the speaker's words. Jinendrabuddhi follows this re-interpretation as appears from his gloss on the term *nivṛttiviśiṣṭa*, "qualified by exclusion," which he maintains qualifies the person speaking. This understanding departs completely from the rationale of the original *apoha* theory, which aims at substituting exclusion of other referents for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal as a real entity inherent in things and the justification for the application of words to things. As already mentioned, according to Dignāga, exclusion of other referents comes with all the attributes of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal as resident in things and words. Thus Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is not true to the rationale of Dignāga's *apoha* thesis.

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. Pind 1999.

**3.12** Although Dharmakīrti's philosophy is the main source of Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* theory, it is, on the other hand, evident that Jinendrabuddhi had access to and made use of already existing commentaries on PSV. For instance, he must have used the same source as the Jain philosopher Siṃhasūri, who wrote a detailed commentary of Mallavādin's criticism of Dignāga's *apoha* thesis, because there are several cases where Jinendrabuddhi's glosses and explanations are almost identical with those found in Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādin's work. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that Siṃhasūri's explanations of theoretically crucial passages of PSV V are more reliable reproductions of Dignāga's original view than those found in PST. This remarkable similarity is difficult to explain unless we assume that Jinendrabuddhi had access to and copied or slightly rephrased explanations found in an older commentary on PSV.

**3.13** It is not possible to identify the source with absolute certainty, because Siṃhasūri merely identifies certain explanations occurring in Mallavādin's work as presented by the *ṭīkākāraḥ*.<sup>52</sup> Given the authority of the source, as indicated by the fact that Mallavādin in several cases conflates Dignāga's text with that of the *Ṭīkā*, and further indicated by Jinendrabuddhi's use of the same source as a valid explanation of Dignāga's view on a particular issue, it is not unreasonable to assume that the work may be identical with the *Ṭīkā*, which Devendrabuddhi composed according to the Tibetan Buddhist scholar Bu ston. Thus it is not unlikely that it is this work to which Siṃhasūri refers and quotes as one of Mallavādin's sources. Mallavādin probably made extensive use of the *Ṭīkā* even without indicating that he was quoting or slightly rephrasing it. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why the phrase: *tato naiva prakāśakaṃ syāt* that occurs in Mallavādin's work as quoted at NCV 708,13–14, surfaces in Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* PST Ms B 71a7 as *tataś ca naiva prakāśayet*. The sentence belongs in the context of explaining PSV II 15. The similarity of phrasing and syntax is striking and undeniable. In any case, Jinendrabuddhi must have considered the unknown commentary a valid source of information on Dignāga's philosophy, as

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<sup>52</sup> Cf. NCV 621,25. The plural *ṭīkākāraiḥ* is in all likelihood to be interpreted as respect language. Cf. Renou 1961: § 207.

appears from the fact that he, Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri used it and apparently made no attempt to distinguish between Dignāga's own statements and the explanations attributed to the *Ṭīkā*.

**3.14** I quote below selected passages from Siṃhasūri's *Nayacakravṛtti* juxtaposed with those of PST V; they illustrate Jinendrabuddhi's dependence on the source used by Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri: He apparently either quotes or edits it slightly to fit it into his own exposition. The quotations – often *verbatim* – are such that there can be no doubt that both authors rely on the same source, in all likelihood an old and authoritative *Ṭīkā*, although it remains an open question whose work it is. As already mentioned it may be identical with the *Ṭīkā* attributed to Devendrabuddhi. The following examples show beyond doubt that we are not presented with chance similarities: In spite of minor differences of expression, Jinendrabuddhi evidently utilized the same source as Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri. The collection of examples is not exhaustive:

1. PST Ms B 193b1: *ānantyād ity upapattiḥ. kasyānantyāt? prakṛtatvād bhedānām eva*; cf. NCV 627,14–15: *ānantyād iti hetuḥ. kasyānantyāt? bhedānām, yasmāt te pūrvaṃ prakṛtā na cānyaḥ śrūyate*.
2. PST Ms B 193,2: *ākhyātum; karoter anekārthatvāt*; cf. NCV 627,17: *kartum ākhyātum; karoter anekārthatvāt*.
3. PST Ms B 193b2: *tad etad dhetudvayam uktam: ānantaṃ sambandhāśakyatve hetuḥ, anākhyātasambandhatvaṃ punar anabhidhāne*; cf. NCV 627,22: *atra cānantaṃ pāraṃparyeṇānabhidhānahetuḥ. tato hi sambandhāśakyatā, sambandhāvyutpatter anabhidhānam*.
4. PST Ms B 193b6: *mlecchāśabde hi śabdavarūpamātram eva pratiyate, nārthaḥ*; cf. NCV 627,23–628,7: *yatra śabdasyārthena sambandho 'vyutpanno yathā mlecchāśabdānāṃ tatra śabdāmātram eva pratiyate nārtha ityādiḥ*.
5. PST Ms B 226b1: *syād etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatirekākhyānasyāpi sarvatrāsambhava*, cf. NCV 652,16: *syād etad vyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ*.

6. PST Ms B 208a7: *tathā hi te vināpi vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṛṣṭāḥ, na vṛkṣaśabdatvādikaṃ sāmānyam*, cf. NCV 653,19ff: *tathā hi te vināpi vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṛṣṭāḥ, na tu vṛkṣaśabdo 'nyatra dṛṣṭāḥ, tasmād vṛkṣaśabdenaiva pratyāyanam upapannam*.
7. PST Ms B 226b1: *syād etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatirekākhyāna-syāpi sarvatrāsambhava iti*, cf. NCV 652,16: *syād etad vyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ*.  
 PST Ms B 226b4: *yasmād darśanasya tattulye sarvatrāsambhavo 'tattulye tu sambhavo 'darśanasya*, cf. NCV 652,18: *yasmād darśanasya sarvatrāsambhavaḥ. saty api ca darśane sarvathānumānā-bhāvaḥ*.
8. PST Ms B 228a7–228b1: *tad eva tu vastv asadvyāvṛttaṃ sākṣād abhidhīyate. tatas tasya ye viśeṣās te tadavyatirekān na pratikṣipyante*, cf. NCV 733,15: *atra punar asatpratiśedhena sākṣād vartata iti tasya ye viśeṣās tān na pratikṣipati*.
9. PST Ms B 228b1–2: *ata eva bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti. na hy anyatra mukhyavṛttiḥ śabdo dravyādiṣūpacaryate*, cf. NCV 733,16–17: *bhāktadoṣo 'py ata eva nāsti, na hy anyatra mukhyā vṛttir dravyādiṣūpacaryate*.

Apart from PSV and other works by Dignāga, Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri had access to Dignāga's SPVy from which they presumably quote the *lakṣaṇavākya* on *apoha*, cf. NCV 611,5ff,<sup>53</sup> as well as works by *ṭikākārās*, cf. NCV 621,25ff. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi too had access to other works by Dignāga or his commentators when he wrote PST. For instance, he either quotes or refers to Dignāga's SPVy three times.<sup>54</sup> Judging from the parallel passages found in PSV V the passages from SPVy represent a more discursive treatment of the same subject, although the vocabulary is basically the same. The fragmentary Chinese translation of a few of the introductory verses of this treatise makes it impossible to infer its scope.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 181.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. PST Ms B 229b1–2, *Translation* n. 464; PST Ms B 239a1–2, *Translation* n. [301]; PST Ms B 238b7–239a2, *Translation* n. 607.

## 4 The critical edition of PST V

**4.1** The Sanskrit manuscript of PST V comprises Ms B 191a7–242b7. The objective of the critical edition of PST V presented in the apparatus as an integral part of the annotation is to establish a readable version of the unique manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's PST V. The edition occasionally leaves out brief sentences that are not important for understanding Dignāga's thought or restoring PSV V into Sanskrit. Jinendrabuddhi's erudite remarks on *upacāra* (transference) recorded at PST Ms B 198a–198b have been left out too, as they add nothing theoretically important to the grammatical and philosophical issues of *upacāra*. His excursus on central philosophical issues of the *apoha* theory are edited separately and included in *Appendix 2* through 4. In all, well over 90 percent of PST V is edited and included in the annotation and appendices. The main purpose of the edition is to emend obvious scribal mistakes and occasionally to suggest conjectures. This has in general proved to be unproblematic as scribal errors in most cases are easy to identify and correct. The generally excellent Tibetan translation of PST edited in Hattori 1982 has been helpful as it is useful for corroborating the suggested emendations. Jinendrabuddhi occasionally quotes original Sanskrit sources in PST V in support of his commentary. Where possible I have identified the sources of the quotations and if necessary corrected the readings of PST on the basis of the published editions of these works. A few passages of PST Ms B are unreadable as are the corresponding Tibetan conversions (see 4.3f). Fortunately, it is possible to solve most of these problems. There are a few lacunae and missing phrases in the manuscript – mirrored in the Tibetan translation – which in a few instances make it impossible to understand the intended argument. Other passages are unreadable as words or lines were distorted beyond recognition in the process of copying the manuscript, with the result that it is impossible to construe a few paragraphs, and the Tibetan version which evidently reflects a manuscript containing the same omissions does not help solving the problem. In a few cases difficulties of construing Jinendrabuddhi's text made the highly competent Tibetan translator suggest an implausible Tibetan rendering of the Sanskrit text he attempted to reproduce.

**4.2** I have punctuated the critical edition without regard for the occasionally meaningful punctuation of PST Ms B as I consider the use of comma, semicolon, and full stop to be more helpful for the reader of an occasionally complicated text than traditional indigenous punctuation. The punctuation marks reflect my interpretation of the syntax of the Sanskrit original and are primarily intended to present a version of Jinendrabuddhi's work that is syntactically understandable to a modern reader. Sandhi has been adjusted accordingly. The manuscript has proved to be an invaluable source of information on the Sanskrit version of PSV which Jinendrabuddhi commented upon. Apart from the substantial number of *pratīkas* quoted from the original source or the sources Jinendrabuddhi consulted for his *Ṭīkā*, his paraphrases of the Sanskrit text of PSV V have proved to be an excellent means for restoring a substantial number of paragraphs of PSV V into Sanskrit, as they contain important information on the syntax of phrases of PSV V. In one instance Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase includes a crucial phrase that for unknown reasons was missing in the manuscripts used by the two Tibetan translator teams (see 2.8 and 2.6).

### **The Tibetan translation of PST**

**4.3** The Tibetan translation of PST (hence T) attributed to Lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa is generally of a high standard and an important source of information on the readings of the Sanskrit manuscript of PST used by the translator. It is therefore of considerable value for text critical purposes. It contains nonetheless a number of passages that are impossible to construe and understand. In most cases they are either due to misinterpretations of the original Sanskrit ms or due to wrong readings found in the manuscript upon which the translator relied. Although the Tibetan sources indicate that the translation is based upon another Sanskrit manuscript than PST Ms B, it is evident that it must have been based upon a manuscript with similar readings, because T reflects wrong readings, which also occur in PST Ms B.

**4.4** For instance, Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V 46ab at PST Ms B 211a1-2 in this form: *apoddhāre padanyāyaṃ vākyād arthe vikalpita iti*. This clause is reproduced in T 177,36-37 as: *'di ni sel ba'i sgo la gañ*

*’di’i ’di dag las don du brtags pa’o zes ’chad par ’gyur ro*. The translation is meaningless. It is evidently based upon a corrupt text like the one found in PST Ms B. One wonders if the translator himself could make sense of it. There is no reason to assume, however, that the reading of the translator’s manuscript differed essentially from that of PST Ms B on this particular point. The most likely explanation is that originally the corruption was introduced because of a misreading or misreproduction of the ligature */ddh/* that at some point in the transmission of the manuscript was read as */dv/*, which would yield *apodvāre*. It is therefore likely that the translator attempted to emend the reading of his manuscript because *apodvāre* is reproduced as *sel ba’i sgo la* corresponding to Sanskrit *\*apohadvāre*, which has no support in PST Ms B. The translator may have conjectured that the meaningless *apodvāre* was to be emended to read *apohadvāre* and inserted an extra syllable */ha/* in a desperate attempt to make sense of the compound.

**4.5** In one case the translator misinterpreted the phrase *cādyupādānaḥ* < *cādi* < *ca* + *ādi* + *upā°* as derived from *vādin* + *upā°*. This appears from the translation *rgol pas ñe bar len pa* T 155,15, which is utterly meaningless.<sup>55</sup> The reading *sāmānyaviśeṣā vastvavacchedahetutvāt* recorded at PST Ms B 215a2 is translated in T as *spyi dañ khyad par gyi dños po ma yin pa gcod pa’i rgyu ñid kyi phyir*. The otherwise meticulous translator evidently read *sāmānyaviśeṣāvastvavacchedahetutvāt* as a compound and translated it accordingly in spite of the fact that it is incomprehensible. Apparently he assumed that vowel */ā/* of *sāmānyaviśeṣā* and *vastu°* was due to sandhi: the result of *sāmānyaviśeṣa-* + *avastu* (= *dños po ma yin pa*). Apparently he did not reflect upon whether his interpretation made sense in the context of the argument: he merely translated the text as he read it. The example illustrates once again that Tibetan translators tend to render what they read in their Sanskrit manuscripts, in spite of the fact that it makes no sense in the context.

**4.6** Although the number of translation mistakes appears to be limited – most of them are due to scribal errors introduced into the

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 44.

Sanskrit manuscript on which T is based – the translation is sometimes difficult to understand and invariably leads to wrong conclusions about the context of a particular argument. For instance, at PST Ms B 242b5 we find the reading *anirdiṣṭappravartakam* that Blo gros brtan pa reproduces as *ñes par bstan pa 'jug par byed pa*. The translation, however, makes no sense in the context, and any reader, who is unaware of the fact that Jinendrabuddhi quotes a passage from Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* (hence NBh), is left with the impression that he has missed the point. Jinendrabuddhi is merely quoting Vātsyāyana's use of the term *anirdiṣṭappravakṛka* in NBh on NSū II 2.1: *anirdiṣṭappravakṛkam pravādapāramparyam aitihiyam*. The error is presumably an old one, but without tracing the correct Sanskrit reading to the original source, it would have been difficult to identify the error and emend the text.

**4.7** It is difficult to explain why Blo gros brtan pa would translate the term *samākhyāsambandhapratīti* (PST Ms B 241a6)<sup>56</sup> as *mtshuñs pa ñid ces bya ba'i 'brel pa rtogs pa* unless we assume that his manuscript erroneously left a space between *samākhyā* and the rest of the compound, which is likely to be true. Consequently he must have interpreted *samākhyā* as a qualifier of *sambandhapratīti* (f.). Moreover, he appears to have read *samākhyā* as a derivative of *samāna*, or he may have conjectured that the correct reading should be *sāmānya*. It is not clear why Blo gros brtan pa employs the speech units *ñid* and *ces bya ba*. No matter what motivated the translation, it is utterly incomprehensible in the context. The term *samākhyāsambandhapratīti*, however, is found in Vātsyāyana's commentary on the same *sūtra*, namely NSū II 2.1. These examples illustrate the nature of the philological problems involved in studying the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of PST. In spite of the fact that the Tibetan translation of PST is excellent it is clear that without having recourse to the original Sanskrit version it is difficult to understand why certain Tibetan passages are meaningless, unless one is in a position to identify the cause of the philological problem as being based upon a faulty Sanskrit manuscript or misinterpretation of its readings.

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<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Appendix 3* where the Sanskrit phrase is edited.



**4.8** In spite of its occasional faults the Sanskrit manuscript shows that the Tibetan version of PST V reflects a Sanskrit version that in general appears to have been similar to the one recorded by the scribe who copied PST Ms B. In a few places there are minor gaps in PSV V. Since they also occur in T, which for this reason is impossible to construe, it is obvious that the Sanskrit source on which T is based descends from a similar Ms. Apart from minor gaps in PST Ms B as reflected in T, it is possible to infer from the Tibetan translation that there is one of approximately seven lines between PST Ms B 237a7 and 238a1. The missing passage is part of Jinendrabuddhi's comment upon PSV V 46. The commentary of the entire paragraph is reproduced in T, which contains several *pratīkas*; and there is no reason to assume that in the process of the manuscript transmission seven lines of text were suddenly deleted. As the folios contain seven lines recto and verso the conclusion seems inevitable: the otherwise conscientious scribe who copied his manuscript as far as PST Ms B 237a7 forgot to turn the folio and copy 237b1f; instead he continued copying 238a1f.

**4.9** This paragraph is particularly important as it presents Dignāga's view on *pratibhā*, which is influenced by Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. The Sanskrit restoration of this crucial paragraph is therefore not fully supported by Sanskrit *pratīkas*, which is a minor problem as it is written with the background of Bhartṛhari's vocabulary and philosophy of language. It has not been possible to trace the Sanskrit equivalent to the Tibetan term *lcags kyu med pa* to any of Bhartṛhari's extant works or his commentators' explanations. The Tibetan translations *lcags kyu med pa yin pa'i phyir ro V : lcags kyu med pa'i phyir ro K* reproduce in all likelihood the expression *\*niraṅkuśatvāt*. Surprisingly, I have succeeded in tracing the term to Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (BSūBh) on *Brahmasūtra* II 1.3.11. Addressing the nature of *utprekṣā* Śaṅkara describes it as unfettered, like Dignāga. There is no reason to assume that Śaṅkara's use of the expression *niraṅkuśa* stems from Dignāga's work. On the contrary, it mirrors undoubtedly Bhartṛhari's vocabulary and an aspect of his philosophy of language about which we are not well informed.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Translation* n.s 574–575.

## 5 The Sanskrit restoration of PSV V

**5.1** Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* is a valuable source of information on the original Sanskrit version of PSV. With the background of the Sanskrit evidence it is possible to solve many of the nearly inextricable philological difficulties that beset the study of the Tibetan translations of PSV, assuming that Jinendrabuddhi quotes and comments upon the original Sanskrit version of the treatise. This, however, is not absolutely certain as he relied upon information contained in at least one earlier *Ṭīkā* on PSV as I have shown (see 3.14), and he may therefore not always quote from the original Sanskrit version of PSV, but rather from whatever material he found included in the sources that he was using when writing his *Ṭīkā*.

**5.2** PST contains a considerable number of *pratīkas*, which are of inestimable importance for interpreting the vocabulary and syntax of the Tibetan translations of PSV V: The Sanskrit evidence indicates that Jinendrabuddhi in many cases chose to paraphrase Dignāga's original Sanskrit exposition in order to present his views in his own words, adding glosses in the well-established manner of Indian commentators, as a means of explaining his terse statements. Thus they are helpful in restoring the Sanskrit text underlying its Tibetan conversions. Jinendrabuddhi also quotes passages from works written by Dignāga's contemporary opponents like the Sāṃkhya philosopher Mādhava and an unknown Jaina *vaibhāṅika* "distinctionist," who criticised the *apoha* theory. These examples would indicate that Dignāga in general incorporated into his own presentation, although in slightly edited form, quotations from works written by authors, whose views he addressed. For instance, when writing the important paragraph on *pratibhā* at PSV V 46, which reflects Dignāga's intimate knowledge of Bhartr̥hari's philosophy of language, he quotes a slightly edited version of one of Bhartr̥hari's own statements on the topic of *pratibhā* recorded in *Vākyapadīya-svavṛtti* I; Dignāga even incorporates into the *pratibhā* section of PSV V *pādas* lifted from *Vākyapadīya*. Thus, PSV V 47 quotes *pāda* d and c of VP II 134–35, respectively.<sup>58</sup> And in the passage at PSV V 50a where

<sup>58</sup> See *Translation* n.s 580–581.

Dignāga quotes two verses from VP II 155–156 he incorporates edited extracts from Bhartṛhari's *Svavṛtti* on these verses.<sup>59</sup>

**5.3** Under these circumstances, I have attempted *exempli gratia* to restore as much as possible of PSV V into Sanskrit.<sup>60</sup> I think it is necessary to emphasize, though, that the proposed restorations reflect the nature of their primary sources viz. PST and the limited number of quotations of PSV V recorded in independent Sanskrit sources. From a strictly philological point of view all of these are secondary sources. As the occasional differences between the text upon which Jinendrabuddhi comments and the versions recorded in K and V would indicate, the transmission of PSV may not have been uniform, and the fifth chapter is no exception, as the evidence from other chapters of PSV would indicate. This divergence is difficult to understand, unless we assume that the Sanskrit manuscripts of PSV that were in circulation at the time when the two translator teams completed their efforts had been subject to textual changes and interpolations. The difference of readings is reflected, for instance, in the Tibetan versions of the *Vṛtti* on PSV V 3 upon which Jinendrabuddhi comments (see 2.14). This paragraph differs markedly from the Tibetan translations of K and V, which, moreover, exhibit individual differences that cannot merely be attributed to incorrect renderings of the Sanskrit manuscripts that Kanakavarman and Vasudhararakṣita were translating into Tibetan. In cases like this I have adopted the readings suggested by PST, except when K and V support each other against the readings of PST.

**5.4** The Sanskrit restoration is one *strictu sensu*: The restored paragraphs only comprise those parts of PSV V which PST V and independent sources make it possible to reconstruct with reasonable certainty. I have only attempted to fill in the lacunae in a limited number of cases, where the context and parallels make it possible to suggest a hypothetical restoration that is beyond doubt. These passages are enclosed in <...>. As part of the annotations I have also restored passages from

<sup>59</sup> See Pind 2003.

<sup>60</sup> The first chapter of PSV is restored by Ernst Steinkellner and published online (PSV<sub>5</sub> I).

other chapters of Dignāga's PSV based upon critically edited versions of the corresponding paragraphs of Jinendrabuddhi's PST, when they shed light on issues which Dignāga addresses in PSV V. The text of the restored Sanskrit passages is presented in separate annotations, indicated by square brackets in bold, numbered 1 through 320. For each note, the relevant *pratīkas* and paraphrases found in PST as well as quotations traced to independent Sanskrit philosophical literature are quoted. In the apparatus I have underlined all words and passages of Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases that match the Tibetan versions of K or V. It is thus possible to follow how I interpret the Sanskrit evidence of PST in the light of the Tibetan evidence of K and V, and linguistically justify the proposed Sanskrit restorations. In all, it has been possible to restore approximately eighty percent of the fifty *kārikās* of PS V and approximately seventy five percent of PSV V.

### 5.5 The Sanskrit restoration is based upon the following sources:

1. The Tibetan translations recorded in K and V as mentioned above.
2. Sanskrit verse and prose fragments of PS and PSV V quoted as *pratīkas* in Ms B of PST V.
3. Sanskrit paraphrases of PSV V traced to Ms B of PST V.
4. Sanskrit verse and prose fragments of PSV V quoted in Sanskrit philosophical literature.

Sanskrit quotations or *pratīkas* embedded in PST V do not constitute a philological problem *per se* unless they are contradicted by other sources. If more than one source contradicts a particular reading there is reason to assume that it is dubious. For instance, the reading *vivecitaḥ* that occurs in the quotation of PS V 46b at TSP 363,15–16 is contradicted by three sources viz. PST V which reads *vikalpitaḥ* for *vivecitaḥ*, and KV which read *rnam par brtags*, thus corroborating PST V. Whatever the source of this reading might have been, it is clearly secondary and should be rejected as spurious.<sup>61</sup> In a similar case PST

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<sup>61</sup> Abhayadevasūri, who relied on TSP, quotes the verse with the reading *vivecitaḥ* in his commentary on *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇa* I 188,9. Thus, it is not a recent corruption.

Ms B reads *iṣṭā* at PS V 27d as opposed to *tulyā*, the reading recorded at NCV 649,11, which both K and V corroborate. The reading *tulyā* is therefore preferable, especially as the reading *iṣṭā* necessitates a forced and dubious interpretation of the verse in which it occurs.

**5.6** In the case of *pratīkas* or Sanskrit quotations from other sources the principle has been to identify the Tibetan words or phrases of K and V that match the Sanskrit quotations. It is sometimes difficult to identify Sanskrit matches, as the syntax of Dignāga's original Sanskrit writing and relevant terms are not always correctly reproduced in K and V, since the translators were having difficulties interpreting the Sanskrit manuscripts they were translating (see 2.1–15). For instance, the term *kṛtam*, which is syntactically important for understanding the argument at PSV V 28c–d, is only translated in K.<sup>62</sup> It occurs, however, in the paraphrase recorded in Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā*.<sup>63</sup> In a few instances PST V makes it possible to identify a clause that is missing in both K and V, although it is crucial for understanding Dignāga's thought (see 2.8).

**5.7** If the Sanskrit restoration is based exclusively upon Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases of Dignāga's Sanskrit original, the problem of identifying suitable Sanskrit matches is sometimes considerable, especially when the Tibetan readings of K and V are problematic. In such cases the proposed Sanskrit restoration reflects the principle followed by Indian commentators when quoting and commenting on a passage that needs to be elucidated: the terms of the quotation are *followed* by their glosses. For example, the paraphrase of PSV V 36ab at PST Ms B 227b5ff reads *sāmānyaśabdasya yat kṛtyaṃ pratyāyyam. tat punaḥ kīdṛśam? arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāpratīkṣeṇa*. The Tibetan translations show that this paraphrase is basically a *verbatim* reproduction of the first sentence of Dignāga's prose commentary on PS V 36ab including an explanatory gloss *pratyāyyam* followed by the rhetorical question *tat punaḥ kīdṛśam?* In the present case K and V do not contain identifiable matches for *kṛtyam*, which Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase would seem to presuppose. Instead of the expected Tibetan reading *hya ba*

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Translation* n.s [189] and 368.

<sup>63</sup> Cf PST Ms B 221a3–7 quoted ad loc.

both K and V read *byas pa* (= *kṛtam*), and one cannot exclude the possibility that this translation reflects the Sanskrit reading of their manuscripts, although it is incomprehensible in the context, unless *kṛtam* is interpreted as a neuter *ta*-participle which is well established as an action noun<sup>64</sup> similar to *kṛtyam* in terms of its semantics.

**5.8** Fortunately the reading *kṛtyam* is quoted by Siṃhasūri at NCV 730,1ff followed by the gloss *vyāpāraḥ: sāmānyaśabdasya hi sadāder yo 'rthāntaravyudāso "asan na bhavati" iti kṛtyam vyāpāraḥ sa tvayettham avadhāritāḥ svabhedāpratikṣepeṇeti*. In this case the gloss *vyāpāraḥ* "function" covers as a matter of fact the denotation of *kṛtyam* much better than Jinendrabuddhi's gloss *pratyāyyam*. Siṃhasūri's quotation contains the crucial particle *hi*, which is to be construed with *iti*. But Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase omits *hi*. As *kṛtyam*<sup>65</sup> occurs in an identical context in PST and NCV the reading is beyond doubt and we can safely adopt it for the purpose of restoring the original Sanskrit phrase. If Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases do not contain any identifiable glosses and his exposition matches the Tibetan translations of V or K, it is reasonable to assume that he reproduces the Sanskrit version of PSV V in the form that was known to him with minor syntactical adjustments to his own presentation, like the omission of the particle *hi*.

**5.9** Sometimes Jinendrabuddhi resorts to the use of analytical strings (*vigraha*) as commentators often do in order to explain the scope of technical terms. For instance, the term *naimittika* that occurs in the restored phrase *naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu* at PSV V 50a is explained at PST Ms B 238b2–3 as follows: *naimittikā jātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdāḥ. teṣu ... anyāpohena sāmānyarūpeṇābhidhānaṃ sambhavati*. The first sentence presents a gloss explaining what constitutes *naimittikāḥ śabdāḥ*. The Tibetan versions of K and V would seem to presuppose a phrase like *\*naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu*, which Jinendrabuddhi's explanation corroborates. The original loc. pl. of the Sanskrit phrase is reproduced in the following explanation which introduces the loc. pl. *teṣu*. This pronominal

<sup>64</sup> Cf. A III 3.114: *bhāve napuṃsake ktaḥ*.

<sup>65</sup> The semantics of *kṛtyam* encountered in Buddhist Sanskrit literature imitates MI *kiccam*.

locative merely has the function of imitating the original locative pl. of the definition of *naimittikā °śabdāḥ*, from which we only have to extract the term *śabdāḥ* in order to restore the original Sanskrit phrase. Thus the grammatical structure of Dignāga's text is carefully reflected in Jinendrabuddhi's explanation, which makes it possible to restore the original sentence complement in the locative: *naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu*. This restoration matches the syntax of the Tibetan translations of K and V and is mirrored in the subsequent noun phrase *yādr̥cchikeṣu tu katham*, which Jinendrabuddhi subsequently quotes.

## 6 Dignāga's philosophy of *anyāpoha*

**6.1** The objective of this study is to present an analysis of the essential features of Dignāga's *apoha* thesis as expounded in PSV V,<sup>66</sup> which is a crucial complement to Dignāga's philosophy of inference as it presents the only definite exposition of his theory of induction. Dignāga develops in this central chapter the idea that joint absence (*vyatireka*) of word and referent in contrast to their joint presence (*anvaya*) defines exclusion of other referents and simultaneously justifies the invariable concomitance of word or speech element and the thing denoted. Thus, by extension, joint absence establishes the invariable connection between the logical indicator (*liṅga*) and the thing indicated (*liṅgin*) because Dignāga claims that verbal cognition is subject to the same constraints as those that characterize knowledge obtained through inference.<sup>67</sup>

**6.2** All sources indicate that *anyāpoha* was conceived as a substitute for real general properties. Kumārila claims, for instance, in the first *śloka* of his *apoha* critique, that exclusion of non-cows as *sāmānya* in principle does not differ from the general property cowhood (*gotva*) as

<sup>66</sup> The analysis draws on the explanations of crucial paragraphs of PSV V presented in the annotations to the *translation*.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. the frequently quoted statement, which Buddhist writers attribute to Dignāga: *apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām eva pratipādyate*. See PVSV 25,27f; TSP 367,17 commenting on Kumārila's statement at ŚV Apohavāda 73ab: *na cānyavyāvṛttimuktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ*.

real entity (*vastu*), and Dignāga rejects the assumption that real general properties are real entities. Kamalaśīla explains that Kumārila's use of the term *sāmānya* in his presentation of the *apoha* doctrine presupposes Dignāga's thesis that the general property (*sāmānya*) as denotable object is characterized by exclusion (*apohalakṣaṇam*).<sup>68</sup> The question is, however, in what way *apoha* could be presented as a general property like *sāmānya*, which contemporary Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers assumed is the semantic condition for the application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). As the Buddhists reject as untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in the object of denotation are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence (*sattā*) and substantiveness (*dravyatva*) or the like. The *apoha* theory is thus very much part of the contemporary Indian philosophical scene at the time when Dignāga propounded his *apoha* doctrine. He addresses the inherent ontological difficulties that attach to the thesis of real general properties in the second chapter of PSV II 16<sup>69</sup> and substitutes *anyāpoha* for real general properties, claiming at PSV V 36d that *anyāpoha* has the same properties as real general properties without being subject to the same absurd consequences as the thesis that real general properties constitute the semantic condition for denotation.

**6.3** In PSV V Dignāga also claims that words denote things (*bhāva*) as qualified by preclusion (*nivṛtti*) of other referents (*arthāntara-nivṛttiviśiṣṭa*).<sup>70</sup> In a theoretically related fragment – presumably from the SPVy – we find a similar phrase which substitutes *vastu* for *bhāva*, claiming that the referent is a real object qualified by preclusion: *nivṛttiviśiṣṭam vastu śabdārthaḥ*.<sup>71</sup> It is thus clear that the *śabdārtha* qualified by *nivṛtti* is conceived as a real object (*vastu*) or entity (*bhāva*). These definitions of denotation and the concomitant function of *nivṛtti*

<sup>68</sup> Cf. TSP 360,15: *apohalakṣaṇam sāmānyam vācyatvenābhidhīyamānam*.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. PSV II 16 restored and translated n. 504.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V 36d.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 182.



raise the obvious question of what a term like *nivṛtti* denotes in this particular context. Neither *nivṛtti* nor its synonyms have verbal implications *per se*. In grammatical contexts *nivṛtti* is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal and is thus semantically related to *apoha* in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V.

**6.4** Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine and its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V were never adopted by post-Dignāga Buddhist scholars without modifications. Their views on *anyāpoha* were inevitably influenced by the works of the central Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, and post-Dharmakīrti thinkers. In fact, the theory of knowledge underlying the original version of the *apoha* doctrine as expounded in PSV V is incompatible with its subsequent elaboration by Dharmakīrti. In spite of an undeniable family likeness between Dignāga's original theory and Dharmakīrti's version of it, there are substantial differences between them, and we must differentiate between Dignāga's views and those of Dharmakīrti and later generations of Buddhist thinkers. Thus it is obvious that the expression "*apoha* theory" does not designate a uniform theory with an invariable set of theoretical presuppositions. This study therefore aims at shedding light on the theoretical obscurities of the *apoha* theory by focussing on some of Dignāga's statements in PSV V, which are crucial to our understanding of its basic presuppositions, and hopefully thereby paving the way for an in-depth study of what suggested to Dharmakīrti to reformulate, in his remarkable oeuvre, some of the basic presuppositions of the *apoha* doctrine in the light of the criticism it met with.

## Verbal knowledge as inference

**6.5** There is one assumption whose importance far outweighs all other elements of the *apoha* theory: Dignāga's claim that verbal knowledge (*śābda*) and inference (*anumāna*) share the same properties. He rejects the commonly acknowledged doctrine that verbal knowledge presupposes the existence of real general properties inherent in things. In

PSV II 16<sup>72</sup> he addresses its absurd consequences and substitutes *anyāpoha* for real general properties, claiming that exclusion has the same properties as real general properties without being subject to the same consequences. Thus Dignāga presents the *apoha* theory as a theoretical achievement superior to the doctrine of real general properties.<sup>73</sup> The question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that there is a functional homology of exclusion or preclusion of other referents and real general properties without generating an ontological *aporia* similar to the one he has shown pertains to the thesis of real general properties. In the first paragraph of PSV V 1 Dignāga propounds the fundamental hypothesis of the *apoha* theory, that verbal knowledge (*śābda*) does not differ from inference (*anumāna*)<sup>74</sup> since a word denotes its referent (*artha*) by means of exclusion of other referents (*anyāpoha*) in the same way as indicators like “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*). And Dignāga continues explaining that when a word is applied to an object (*viśaya*) it denotes any given part or attribute (*aṃśa*) of it by exclusion of other referents (*artha*), like the general property “being produced,”<sup>75</sup> which excludes things that are not produced (*akṛtaka*).<sup>76</sup>

**6.6** The reason why Dignāga introduces the abstract term *kṛtakatva* in the context of explaining that verbal cognition is inferential, is to show that exclusion of other referents (*anyāpoha*) is in fact equivalent

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 504 where PSV II 16 is restored and translated.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. PSV V 36d where its superior merits (*guṇotkarṣa*) are mentioned; cf. *Translation*.

<sup>74</sup> This assumption, however, was re-interpreted by Dignāga’s influential commentator, Dharmakīrti, whose work was to dominate Buddhist epistemology and logic for centuries. Dharmakīrti’s work shows that the inferential nature of verbal cognition was no longer of any theoretical concern because he re-interprets Dignāga’s original statement about the inferential nature of verbal cognition in such a way that the inference is presented as one of the speaker’s intention (*vivakṣā*) and not of the referent (*artha*) as Dignāga originally assumed. Cf. *Translation* n. 9.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *Translation* PSV V 33ab.

<sup>76</sup> For the implications of Dignāga’s introduction of the abstract affix *tva* after *kṛtaka*, cf. *Translation* n. 14.

to a general property (*sāmānya*). This is shown by an important passage at PSV V 33ab in which Dignāga explains that:

In the exact same way as the general property (*sāmānyam*) ‘being produced’ (*kṛtakatvam*) is [explained] to indicate ‘impermanence’ (*anityatvagamakam*) through its exclusion of what is not a product (*akṛtakavyudāsenā*), the general property in a word (*śabde*) is explained [to be] due to its exclusion of other words (*śabdāntaravyavacchedenā*); and only through this (*tenai-va ca*) does it indicate its referent (*arthapratyāyakaḥ*).

Although this explanation is intended to describe what constitutes the general property in a word (*śabde*), the explanation is evidently presented on the analogy of the general property in a referent (*arthe*), which by definition is characterized as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Thus, Dignāga’s explanation makes it possible to conclude that the general property “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*) qualifies produced things (*kṛtaka*) by excluding them from things that are not produced (*akṛtaka*). Dignāga rejects the view that general properties are ontologically singular entities inherent in things, but he does not reject the idea that there are general properties, although of a different order. In fact, he defines general properties as exclusion of other, which leads to the question of how he justifies establishing an invariable connection between indicator and indicated and word and referent with the background of preclusion or exclusion of other.

**6.7** Dignāga’s theory of knowledge is characterised by a well-known set of dichotomies. The object of immediate sensation (*pratyakṣa*) is the *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e. the individual character of things, which by definition is beyond linguistic representation. The object of the indicator or the word and the thing indicated or the referent is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, i.e. the general character of things, and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is according to Dignāgan epistemology the domain of inference and language. The term *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is rarely used in PSV and Dignāga never defines its exact scope, but limits himself to state without any qualifications that it is the object of inference and verbal communication. However, the explanation at PSV I 2c<sub>2</sub>-d<sub>1</sub> is in a way an implicit definition of the content of the term:

*svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇādi grhītvā nityatayā cānityaṃ varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte.*<sup>77</sup>

“For having perceived a colour or the like through its individual and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and colourness, [respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, one combines [the two] at the thought: ‘Colour, etc., is impermanent.’”

In this phrase we notice the distinction Dignāga makes between the general property *varṇatva*, i.e. colourness and the term *varṇa* denoting a particular colour. He also introduces the abstract term *anīyatā* in order to explain the judgement “colour or the like (*varṇādi*) is impermanent (*anīyam*).” Although Dignāga never defines *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and the implications of this term in the context of Dignāga’s ontology and theory of knowledge have never been answered, it is clear as shown by PSV V 33ab quoted above that *sāmānya* is defined in terms of exclusion of other referents.

**6.8** Exclusion of other referents presupposes that the relation (*sambandha*) between the word and the thing it denotes is subject to the constraints of invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*): They are supposed to be invariably concomitant (*avinābhāvin*) in the same way as the logical indicator and the indicated. Dignāga assumes that the relation (*sambandha*) between the word and its referent is comparable to that of the inferential sign (*hetu* or *liṅga*) and the thing it indicates, which shows that Dignāga established his philosophy of language on the basis of his logical theory. This is confirmed by a passage in the chapter on the role of exemplification (*drṣṭānta*) presented at PSV IV 5<sup>78</sup> in which he explains the connection between the word and its referent in terms of the rules that must be observed for establishing the connection between the indicator and the thing indicated. In other words, they are subject to the triple constraints of the *trairūpya*.<sup>79</sup> The severe criticism

<sup>77</sup> For a translation and analysis of this phrase, cf. *Translation* n. 1.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 9.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 9.

which Kumāṛila, for instance, levelled at Dignāga's view of *śabda* as similar to the logical reason of an inference takes this assumption for granted,<sup>80</sup> and PSV V and contemporary sources indicate beyond doubt that Dignāga established the *apoha* theory on the analogy of his philosophy of logic.

**6.9** Thus the postulated similarity of the logical indicator and the word are fundamental to the *apoha* theory. The question is how Dignāga avoids the absurd implication that the word occurs *at* the thing it indicates in the same way, for instance, as the logical indicator smoke, which could justifiably be said to occur *at* the thing it indicates viz. fire. His presentation and vocabulary makes constant use of the locative to denote the referent, which any word denotes. However, words do not occur *at* their referents like logical indicators. The word 'smoke,' for instance, does not occur *at* smoke, nor *at* fire. The theory would thus seem to be based upon patently absurd assumptions. Dignāga's critic, Kumāṛila, subjected this apparent absurdity to a thorough examination in the Śabdapariccheda chapter of his *Ślokavārttika*. The problem relates to the semantics of the locative and the ambiguities entailed by the application of the *trairūpya* to the presuppositions of verbal knowledge without adjusting the expressions of the theory of logic to a different although comparable context, that of verbal knowledge.<sup>81</sup>

**6.10** Since Dignāga elaborated the *apoha* thesis on the basis of his philosophy of logic, it is essential to understand how the connection (*sambandha*) between a term and the thing it denotes is established as invariably connected (*avinābhāvin*). In PSV V 50b towards the very end of the chapter, Dignāga describes how the connection between the word "*panasa*," breadfruit tree, and a prototypical instance of a breadfruit tree is taught. The discussion centres on the question of whether

<sup>80</sup> See Kumāṛila's criticism at ŚV Śabdapariccheda 68–98. Cf. 6.9 below.

<sup>81</sup> Dignāga's statements are ambiguous as their interpretation depends upon the meaning of his use of the locative. See PSV V 34 and *Translation* n.s 416, 419 where I suggest that it is possible to interpret the use of the locative in terms that are compatible with its use in Sanskrit grammatical literature and lexicography.

or not verbal cognition is comparable to inference in the situation where someone is taught the denotation of words. Dignāga answers that learning the denotation of a word is not inference because learning the denotation of a word is the condition of *apoha* and thus of verbal cognition as inference. This paragraph addresses the process of *vyutpatti*: teaching the denotation of a word by ostentation (*hastasaṃjñā*).

**6.11** Dignāga's description of *vyutpatti* assumes that someone points to a prototypical example of a breadfruit tree, and explains "this is a breadfruit tree" (*ayam panasaḥ*). Thereby the learner understands the connection between the term "*panasa*" and the thing it denotes. Dignāga puts weight on the deictic function of the demonstrative pronoun "this" (*ayam*) which accompanies the ostentation because the syntactical agreement between the pronoun and the term "*panasa*," the name of the object, secures the grammatical validity of the reference. In PSV V 50c Dignāga continues explaining that the connection (*sambandha*) between the word and its referent is mentally constructed at the thought "this is the word for that thing." *vyutpatti* thus implicates two separate moments: first, the moment of learning how a term is used by observing its application to its referent, and second, the subsequent moment of constructing the connection in the mind (*manas*).<sup>82</sup> Dignāga closes the paragraph by pointing out that the connection between any term and the thing it denotes is similar to the connection between inference and inferred (*anumānānumeyasambandha*).

**6.12** However, the mentally constructed connection needs to be reified. That is, the person who is learning the denotation of a name like the word "*panasa*" or any other term through *vyutpatti* must ascertain that it refers to *all* instances of the breadfruit tree and not only to the prototype which his teacher is showing him. However, it is impossible to justify the invariable connection of the term *panasa* and its referent, the breadfruit tree, by showing how it applies to every single instance as instances are infinite. Dignāga addresses the problem at PSV V 2b

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<sup>82</sup> In a different context Dignāga explains that *vyutpatti* relates to observed instances of referents (*dr̥ṣṭārtha*), in other instances to those that are not observed (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*). Cf. *Translation* n. 631.

that a general term like “existent” does not denote all particulars (*bhedā*) because

it is impossible (*aśakyah*) to tell (*kartum*) the connection (*sambandhaḥ*) of particulars [with a general term like ‘existent’] when they are infinite; and as the connection of the word [with particulars] is not told (*akṛtasambandhe śabde*), it is not justified that it denotes its referent because merely its own form is cognized (*svarūpamātrapratīteḥ*).

Denotation thus presupposes that the connection of a term like “existent” and its referent is established, which is not possible on the assumption that its connection with every particular instance is ascertained by enumeration showing every single referent, as particulars are infinite. In addition the use of the word “existent” is ambiguous as it denotes many different things like substances or qualities and so on. As mentioned above Dignāga addresses the problem of infinity of particulars at PSV V 2ab and presents at PSV V 34a solution to this classical problem of induction.

### 6.13 He explains that

the word’s connection is feasible (*sambandhasaukaryam*) and there is no ambiguity (*vyabhicāritā*) as it is not observed (*adrṣṭeḥ*) [to apply] to the referent of other words and is also (*apī*) observed (*darśanāt*) [to apply] to a member (*aṃśe*) of its own referent. (PS V 34)

The explanation pivots on the implication of “observation” (*darśana*) and “non-observation” (*adrṣṭi*) because Dignāga claims that the feasibility of the connection (*sambandhasaukarya*) depends upon the application of e.g. the term “existent” to an example of its referent and non-observation of its application to the referent of other words. The question is what the two terms imply in terms of theory of cognition. The following explanation gives the answer: Dignāga assumes that non-observation is the fundamental element of the process of reification. In fact, he equates non-observation to joint absence of word and referent and observation to their joint presence:

For (*hi*) joint presence and joint absence (*anvayavyatirekau*) are a means (*dvāram*) to the word's denoting its referent. And these two are its application to what is similar and its non-application to what is dissimilar. In this case, however (*tu*), application to all that is similar is by necessity not statable with regard to any [referent] whatsoever (*kvacit*) because stating it is impossible (*ākhyānāsambhavāt*) as the referent is infinite (*ānantye 'rthasya*). On the other hand, stating its non-application to what is dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite (*atulye saty apy ānantye*), through mere non-observation (*adarśanamātreṇa*); and just therefore (*ata eva ca*) it has been explained that [the word's] denoting its own referent (*svārthābh dhānam*) is an inference from [its own referent's] exclusion from these [other referents] (*tadvvyavacchedānumānam*), from its not being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata (*svasam-bandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt*). (PSV on PS V 34)

**6.14** Dignāga thus claims that it is easy to justify the connection by means of joint presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*) but he omits addressing the implications of the term "feasibility" (*saukarya*). We must therefore assume that the meaning of the term was evident to contemporary philosophers and that there was no need for explaining its implications. Dignāga's presentation shows that the feasibility of the connection (*sambandhasaukaryam*) depends on the fact that the word is observed to apply to an instance of its referent and not observed to apply to the referents of other words. Non-observation, however, is of a different order than that of temporarily not observing a referent that is not where it would be expected to be, because it has been removed from its locus. It is noteworthy that Dignāga's use of non-observation does not address non-observation of things that have been temporarily removed from their expected place, but rather the universal non-existence in time and space of other things in the locus of the thing to which the indicator refers, and the same goes for the word and its denotation. Thus non-observation ascertains the non-occurrence of other words or indicators in a context where the observer is able to perceive that e.g. the word "tree" denotes a tree and not any other thing with which it is incompatible in terms of its nature and the word used to denote it, and



on the basis of this observation to generalize the non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent, and thereby to ascertain the invariable concomitance of word and referent.

**6.15** Dignāga's use of the term "feasibility" becomes clear from the writings of non-Buddhist philosophers, who address the implications of *sambandhasaukarya*. Dignāga presupposes that a person who is being taught the connection of word and referent (*vyutpatti*) by ostentation (*hastasaṃjñā*) is standing in some place (*ekadeśastha*) next to a prototypical instance of the referent (*artha*), i.e., a member (*aṃśa*) of the domain of similar referents. A knowledgeable person points to the referent explaining that "this x is y." As the referent thus defined occurs in a particular locus and no special conditions apply to it and its locus, the *ekadeśastha* may reify the application of y to any given x through the means of their joint presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*), their joint absence being ascertained merely through not observing (*adarśanamātra*) the application of y to any other thing but the referent x, inferring that y denotes all instances of similar things to the exclusion of all things occurring in the domain of dissimilar things.

**6.16** As mere non-observation of other things in the locus of the prototypical *aṃśa* is easily performed, Dignāga assumes that the reification of the connection between y and x is feasible on the basis of mere non-observation, emphasizing the role of *vyatireka*, joint absence, as the primary means of establishing the connection, the object of non-observation being the non-existence (*abhāva*) of other referents in the locus of the prototypical example. It is therefore understandable that *vyatireka* was interpreted as the primary cause of exclusion being supported by mere non-observation of the word's application to the referents of other words. It is obvious that non-observation in this case does not refer to temporary non-observation of referents that might have been observed to occur in the locus of the taught referent on other occasions. The absence of other referents is substantial: no non-tree (*avṛkṣa*) is ever observed where a tree (*vṛkṣa*) is found. It is therefore possible to conclude from the use of any given term that the referents of other words are not found in the locus of the referent of a particular word which therefore excludes them from its scope. It is thus obvious that verbal knowledge

as inference is based upon joint absence of word and referent, which presupposes the non-existence (*abhāva*) of other things in the locus of the thing inferred.

**6.17** Only on this assumption is it possible to avoid the paradox of uncertainty and the ensuing doubt about the nature of the referent. As Dignāga explains:

If, however, the inference were by means of joint presence (*anvayadvāreṇa*), the word ‘tree’ should not give rise to doubt (*saṁśayaḥ*) appearing as *śiṁśapā*, etc. (*śiṁśapādyābhāsaḥ*), about one and the same entity (*ekasmiṁ vastunī*). Yet, in the same way as there is doubt about it, there will also be doubt appearing as earthenness and substanceness, etc. However, since the word ‘tree’ is not observed to denote what is non-earthen, etc., the inference is only by means of joint absence (*vyatirekamukhenaiva*). (PSV on PS V 34)

In this explanation Dignāga addresses the implications of verbal knowledge as inference. The explanation addresses the extension of individual terms. The term “tree,” for instance, denotes different kinds of trees such as the *śiṁśapā* or the like. The argument addresses the logical implications of basic predication: a *śiṁśapā* is a tree, and a tree is an earthen object, and a substance, and so on. As there are more trees than *śiṁśapās*, and more earthen things than trees, and more substances than earthen things, the individual terms are related in a logical hierarchy according to their individual extension, which makes it possible to infer from the application of the term *śiṁśapā* that it is a tree (*vṛkṣa*), earthen (*pārthiva*), and a substance (*dravya*), and existent (*san*) and knowable (*jñeya*). Consequently the inference is based upon joint absence as it presupposes the exclusion of all non-trees from any tree, which is the function of the word “tree,” and only exclusion of non-trees ascertains the validity of the inference. This raises the question of the purpose of a term like “non-tree.”

**6.18** Dignāga addresses this question in the commentary on PSV V 43b, which is a crucial paragraph of the *apoha* chapter:

For the [word] does not exclude a different general property (*anyām jātim*) for each individual substance (*pratidravyam*), but rather (*kiṃ tarhi*) with the intention of denoting the things to be excluded (*vyavacchedyavivakṣayā*) by means of a single general property (*ekena sāmānyadharmaṇa*). And on this point it has been explained (*uktaṃ cātra*) that the inference [of the referent] is from mere non-observation [of the word's application] to what belongs to the class of dissimilar things (*vijātiye 'darśanamātreṇānumānam*).

Any word or speech element is thus seen to denote a prototypical observed instance of the referent but not to denote things that fall outside the scope of denotation of the word whose connection is being taught, i.e. anything that is dissimilar to the referent. Thus observation is context bound, as learning the denotation of any term relates to observation of individual instances of the referent and individual instances of the word applied to denote the referent. However, an inferential rule has to be established which makes it possible to infer that the word "tree" denotes the referent tree irrespective of its individual character. Whatever is dissimilar to the prototypical object is characterized by a single property (*ekadharman*) which is its being non-x. In order to express the absence of the property of being non-x in things that are x Dignāga coined the negative term non-x, which has the purpose to denote the single property (*dharma*) of things that are non-x. Thus the term non-x is derived from the positive term x by means of *vivakṣā* as a convenient means for denoting things that are dissimilar to any x. The terms "tree" and "non-tree" mirror a privative relation that concerns the non-existence of non-x in the locus of any x. Although Dignāga does not attribute reality to things that are aggregates of atoms, which are the only ultimate things that are ontologically real, it is obvious nonetheless that objects have a derived secondary reality, in spite of which it is still possible to maintain that cows or trees are discernible entities to which one may refer by the word "cow" or "tree."

**6.19** This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the inferential status of verbal cognition is based upon the fact that any instance of a thing is dually marked: by its individual character which is only accessible

through perception and as such inexpressible and by its general character which is defined by exclusion, as the identity of any given cow as the referent of the word "cow" is due to the fact that it excludes non-cows. It is not possible to construe non-existence of non-cows in the locus of any cow as an instance of double negation on which many discussions about *apoha* pivot. However, double negation does not exist. The word "non-cow" for instance is merely a secondary derivative of the word "cow." It has been coined to denote anything that is not a cow: a typical *apoha* inference therefore reads "it is a cow as it is not a non-cow." Non-cow, however, is only a generalized referent denoting the single property (*ekadharma*) that defines the negated referent of the word "cow."

**6.20** Dignāga equates verbal cognition to inference by means of joint absence (*vyatirekamukha*),<sup>83</sup> which explains why commentators compare *apoha* to *vyatireka* and unanimously refer to Dignāga's *apoha* theory as "having joint absence as the chief thing" (*vyatirekapradhāna*).<sup>84</sup> Classical Indian scholars interpret *vyatireka* as characterized by non-existence (*abhāvalakṣaṇa*),<sup>85</sup> and Dignāga assumes that joint absence of word (*śabda*) and referent (*artha*) is equivalent to mutual non-existence of any speech unit and non-speech unit and any referent and non-referent, which is implied by his claim that existence of the nature of one thing presupposes the non-existence of the nature of other things.<sup>86</sup> Jayamiśra, Kumārila's commentator, interprets *apoha* in terms of *itaretarābhāva* "mutual non-existence," which mirrors Dignāga's basic assumption that *apoha* presupposes mutual non-existence of excluded and not excluded.<sup>87</sup> With this background this study will address

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<sup>83</sup> Cf. PSV V 34: *vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam*.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 188; Pind 1999: § 8. Kumārila's commentator Jayamiśra refers to followers of Dignāga's *apoha* theory as *vyatirekavādins*, cf. ŚVT 46, 18.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 425.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. *Translation* PSV V 45 and the statement: *ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti*.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. e.g. *Translation* n.s 466, 517, 523.

Dignāga's attribution of all the commonly acknowledged features of real general properties to exclusion.

**6.21** Dignāga evidently conceived *apoha* as a substitute for real general properties. As mentioned above (5.2) the remarkable Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila attributes the view to Dignāga that exclusion of non-cows (*agonivṛtti*) is equivalent to a general property (*sāmānya*).<sup>88</sup> Śāntarakṣita quotes the verse at TS 914 and his commentator Kamalaśīla explains that exclusion of non-cows as general property means general property as qualified by exclusion<sup>89</sup> (*apohalakṣaṇam sāmānyam*), and elsewhere he expressly equates *apoha* to non-existence (*abhāva*).<sup>90</sup> This interpretation of the underlying purpose of the *apoha* theory is, for instance, confirmed by Kumārila, who states loc. cit. that "it is obvious that those who imagine that exclusion of non-cows (*agonivṛtti*) is the denotable general property (*sāmānya*) have designated by the term "exclusion of non-cows" (*agopohagir*) nothing else but [the general property] cowhood (*gotva*) which is a real object (*vastu*)." Kumārila's conclusion is clear: *apoha* is just another name for *sāmānya*, general property. Thus he indirectly corroborates the assumption that *apoha* is a substitute for general properties. However, the role of *apoha* as semantic justification for denotation similar to that of real general properties leaves many questions unanswered.

**6.22** Kumārila continues his criticism asking Dignāga to explain "what the entities (*bhāva*) [viz. cows] are, whose nature consists in exclusion of horses or the like (*aśvādinivṛttyātman*), as it has been explained [viz. by me, Kumārila] that a non-entity (*abhāva*) is equivalent to another entity (*bhāvāntaram*)." Thus, Kumārila, on the one hand, equates preclusion or exclusion, *nivṛtti* or *apoha*, with the category of general property (*sāmānya*), on the other hand, he interprets Dignāga's view

<sup>88</sup> Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1: *agonivṛtṭiḥ sāmānyam vācyaṃ yaiḥ parikalpitam / gotvaṃ vastv eva tair uktam agopohagirā sphuṭam*.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Dharmakīrti's definition of the general property of referents as qualified by exclusion: *arthānāṃ yac ca sāmānyam anyavyāvṛttilakṣaṇam, yanniṣṭhās ta ime śabdā, na rūpaṃ tasya kiñcana*, PV II 30ab.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. TSP 960,15.

of exclusion as involving nothing but the privative opposition between different entities (*bhāva*), one being the negation of the other and thus a non-entity (*abhāva*), which Kumārila interprets as just a different entity (*bhāvāntaram*).<sup>91</sup> Kumārila's observation is not invented *ad hoc*. Indeed, there are statements in the fifth chapter of PSV that corroborate Kumārila's introductory remarks of the *apohavāda* chapter of *Śloka-vārttika*; and Dharmakīrti, for instance, addresses the question of how the general property is exclusion of other referents (*katham idānīm anyāpohaḥ sāmānyam*) at PVSV 39,1ff in an important and theoretically charged paragraph of the *apoha* section of PVSV.<sup>92</sup> And the assumption that *anyāpoha* is equivalent to *sāmānya* is mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi

<sup>91</sup> Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1–2. Kumārila connects elsewhere in ŚV *apoha* as *sāmānya* to *abhāva*; cf. the important discussion in ŚV Śūnyavāda 135ff.

<sup>92</sup> I made the following observation in Pind 1991: 271–272: “One thing is clear: The *apoha* theory represents Dignāga's solution to the epistemological problem raised by his denial of the existence of universals (*jāti* or *sāmānya*). As is well-known, they were conceived by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition as ubiquitous entities inherent in substances (*dravya*), thereby differentiating them (*viśiṣṭa*) as belonging to a certain class of things having certain definable features. In fact, Dignāga's *apoha* theory only becomes fully understandable when we realize that he used it as a substitute for universals, in contexts where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy would formulate its theories with reference to the existence of universals. Thus, for instance, the Dignāgan expression *arthāntaranivṛtṭiviśiṣṭa* is the exact equivalent of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika *jātiviśiṣṭa*. Moreover, in the important section of the *Vṛtti* on PS V 36d [q.v.], he explicitly attributes the properties of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika universal (*jāti*) to the *apoha* ... It appears from a revealing passage in the *Vṛtti* ad PS II 16, in which Dignāga shows the consequences of the assumption that universals are real entities, that certain philosophers attempted to solve the problem of how to justify the existence of universally valid connections between properties [e.g., between smoke and fire], by claiming that knowing the universal in a single substratum is equivalent to knowing it in all. This claim is understandable since it was tacitly assumed that universals would always instantiate in the same way. Hence they could serve as a means of establishing universally valid connections of the kind that was required by the development of contemporary logical theory. However, if one rejects the idea of the universal as untenable, one is left with the problem of accounting for the possibility of universally valid connections. Dignāga evidently solved this fundamental epistemological problem with reference to the *apoha* theory.”

too in an interesting discussion recorded in PSV II 4c.<sup>93</sup> However, the question is, in what way *apoha* could be presented as a general property in contrast to real general properties as semantic condition for the application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). Since the Buddhists rejected as untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in things are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence (*sattā*) and substantiveness (*dravyatva*) or the like.

**6.23** The *apoha* thesis is centred on exclusion as qualifier of the referent of any word. In a central passage Dignāga claims that words denote things (*bhāva*) as qualified by preclusion (*nivṛtti*) of other referents (*arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*).<sup>94</sup> In a theoretically related fragment – presumably from the SPVy – we find a similar phrase which substitutes *vastu* for *bhāva*, claiming that the referent is a real object qualified by preclusion: *nivṛttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ*.<sup>95</sup> It is thus clear that the *śabdārtha* is conceived as a real object (*vastu*) or entity (*bhāva*) qualified by *nivṛtti*. These definitions of denotation and the concomitant function of *nivṛtti* raise the obvious question of what a term like *nivṛtti* denotes in this particular context. Neither *nivṛtti* nor its synonyms have verbal implications *per se*. In grammatical contexts *nivṛtti* is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal, which implies preclusion and is thus semantically related to *apoha* in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V. In order to understand the implications of Dignāga's statements it is necessary to review each of his claims. In the first place it is necessary to address the claim that verbal knowledge is inferential, because it presupposes invariable connection, i.e. concomitance between the word and its referent.

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<sup>93</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 2.2 (1) where Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is quoted and translated.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V 36d.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 182.

**6.24** The evidence recorded in PSV V clarifies the issue. It shows unexpectedly that the *apoha* theory pivots on the concept of non-existence (*abhāva*) and describes non-existence of other referents or words *in* the referent (*arthe*) or *in* the word (*śabde*) as the foundation of preclusion of things and words, thus seemingly imitating well-established philosophical usage among Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers: It is not inherent real general properties in things or words that are the causes of application of words and identity of words, but rather non-existence or preclusion of other, whether things or words. Thus Dignāga attributes the properties of real general properties to exclusion of other referents. A crucial passage at PSV V 45 explains that the statement that “the nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of other things” (*ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti*), has been formulated with regard to (*prati*) the denotable [object]. Thus the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* lies outside the domain of perception and must be considered an abstract entity comparable to a type.

**6.25** The main question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that non-existence of other things understood as exclusion or preclusion of other referents and real general properties are homologous without generating an *aporia* similar to the one that pertains to the thesis that each general property inherent in every single object of denotation is the cause of application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). Dignāga’s claim at PSV V 36d that properties (*dharma*) of exclusion like “being one, eternity, and extension to each single particular” (*ekatvanityatvapratyeka-parisamāpti*) are similar to those of real general properties (*jāti*)<sup>96</sup> is difficult to understand with the background of *apoha* as characterized by joint absence (*vyatireka*) or non-existence (*abhāva*). Dignāga’s justification for this claim is particularly illuminating.

**6.26** He explains that these properties are confined to exclusion

because (1) [exclusion of other referents] is not a particular (*abhedāt*), because (2) its substratum is not discontinued (*āśrayasyāvicchēdāt*), and because (3) its referent is cognized com-

<sup>96</sup> Cf. PSV V 36d.



pletely (*kṛtsnārthapratīteḥ*). (PSV on PS V 36d)

The explanation first addresses the question of the distribution of *apoha* among the particulars like a real general property whose postulated oneness (*ekatva*) is transformed into a particular because of its distribution among the particulars. This argument is only understandable with the background of the postulate that “exclusion of other referents,” *anyāpoha* is qualified by non-existence (*abhāva*) of other referents in the referent. And non-existence is not, like real general properties, divisible because mere non-existence as qualifier of things implies absence of other things from their substrata. It is noteworthy that Dignāga introduces the term *āśraya*, substratum, to justify that *anyāpoha* is eternal like general properties, because this term was commonly used among contemporary grammarians and philosophers to denote the substratum of real general properties. The argument seems obscure, but Dignāga intends to explain that since *apoha* has substrates and as substrates of non-existence are not discontinued, *anyāpoha* is eternal. The substratum of *anyāpoha* thus mirrors the objects (*vastu*) or things (*bhāva*) which according to Dignāga are qualified by preclusion of other referents (*anyārthanivṛttiviśiṣṭa*). As all substrata of the same kind are qualified by non-existence of other referents Dignāga concludes that their knowledge is comprised by exclusion of other referents. It is noteworthy that Dignāga takes care to emphasize that exclusion is not just another type of general property (*bhāva*).<sup>97</sup> However, non-existence *per se* is an indivisible absence, and the universal non-existence of other referents in any particular referent,

<sup>97</sup> Cf. PSV V 36c; 38d; cf. Siṃhasūri’s critique at NCV 735,17–18: *abhāvāntarātvād arthāntarāpohasyāpohavān arthaḥ śabdavācyaḥ na bhavati, ato nāpoho viśeṣaṇaṃ nāpohavān so ’rtha iti yadi tvayeṣṭam*. “If you claim that since the exclusion of other referents is not a different [kind of] entity, exclusion is not a qualifier and the referent is not exclusion possessing.” NCV 734,20: *atha svamatena brūṣe na sāmānyaṃ na vyāvṛttimad iti kutas tadviśiṣṭavastvabhīdhānam. khapuṣpaśekhara viśiṣṭavandhyāputrābhīdhānavat*. “Now, if you say in accordance with your own theory that [exclusion of other] is neither a general property, nor is [the referent] exclusion possessing, then how could the [word] denote a thing as qualified by it [viz. exclusion]. It is like denoting the son of a barren woman as qualified by a wreath of sky flowers!”

e.g. a tree, is the object of inference which qualifies verbal knowledge (*śabda*) as not different from inference.

**6.27** As shown in PSV V 34 Dignāga claims that the inference is based upon joint absence which he qualifies as inference from exclusion of what is other than the referent. Dignāga never presents an *apoha* inference, but Mallavādin's commentator Siṃhasūri gives an example of such inference at NCV 732,10–13:

*arthāntarāpohaḥ sad ity asan na bhavatīti nāsadbhāvamātram evocyate, kiṃ tarhi, arthāntarāpohena viśiṣṭaṃ vastv eva sad ity ucyate, yasmin vastuni so 'pohaḥ kriyate, tac ca dravyaṃ śabdārthaḥ, nāpohamātram. sa cāpohaviśiṣṭo 'rtho dravyādiḥ sacchabdena vyāpto 'parityāgāt, na tu sākṣād uktaḥ.*

“Exclusion of other referents as in the statement ‘it is existent as it is not non-existent’ does not merely express its being non-existent, but rather, that the entity for whose sake the exclusion is effected, is indeed an entity which, being qualified by exclusion of other referents, is said to be ‘existent.’ And this substance is the referent of the word, not mere exclusion. And the referent that is qualified by exclusion viz. a substance, etc., is encompassed by the word ‘existent’ because it is not rejected by it, but it is not denoted directly.”

At NCV 752,21–22 he presents a similar example of an *apoha* inference:<sup>98</sup>

*yatraivādarśanam uktaṃ vṛkṣābhāve 'vṛkṣe, tato vyavacchedānumānam 'avṛkṣo na bhavati' iti. evaṃ ca kṛtvā vṛkṣaśabdād dravya-tvādyanumānam upapannam bhavati.*

“Only with regard to the thing about which non-observation is stated, i.e. with regard to the non-existence of a tree which is a non-tree, the inference is from its exclusion from this [non-tree] at the thought ‘it is not a non-tree;’ and on such grounds the inference of substantiveness, etc., from the word ‘tree’ is justified.”

<sup>98</sup> Cf. *Translation* n. 427.

Verbal cognition as inference is thus based upon what the inferred thing is not, e.g., a tree which is not a non-tree. The latter term is as mentioned above an instance of what Dignāga designates as intention to denote the excluded objects (*vyavacchedyavivakṣā*), “non-tree” denoting things as qualified by the single property (*ekadharma*), non-existence of trees, and the term “tree” as excluding these. As appears from Siṃhasūri’s presentation of an *apoha* inference the negation “is not” (*na bhavati*) merely conveys the notion of negation of non-existence (*abhāva*), and in the present context the notion of negation of non-existence of non-trees. An *apoha* inference would thus seem to be an instance of the type of inference known as *kevalavyatirekin* which is a purely negative type.<sup>99</sup>

## Conclusion

**6.28** Dignāga attempted to show that observation of a prototype of the referent of a word teaches the relation of the word to its referent, which is reified by mere non-observation, i.e. by not observing that the word denotes other things. Thus the *apoha* doctrine pivots on non-existence (*abhāva*) of other things in the referent. Exclusion is thus in the final analysis a matter of ontology. The theory, so it seems, presupposes an extreme ontological parsimony: things are aggregates of atoms which by definition are beyond perception. Dignāga quotes a Sāṃkhya verse to the effect that atoms are not perceptible. Thus words denote things as aggregates of atoms, and the aggregates are the things that exclude other things in accordance with their nature. What Dignāga’s critics found unacceptable was the idea that an absence may qualify things like a general property. The qualifying function, however, is constructed on an absence of other things from the referent. It is in the nature of the referent to exclude from its locus any other referent. The absence is thus basically inscribed in the nature of the referent as a defining property. The idea appears to have been that the absence of other things from any particular referent is equivalent to a general property and as absence is indivisible, the *apoha* theory avoids the ontological problems

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<sup>99</sup> Cf. Randle 1930: 241ff.

of the view that denotation presupposes real general properties inherent in things.

**6.29** Dignāga established the *apoha* theory on the analogy of real general properties. As he rejects the assumption that denotation presupposes that real general properties inherent in the objects of denotation define the identity of verbal denotation and cognition, he must have realized that a possible way of accounting for the identity and difference of things as referents, i.e. as denotable objects, would be to start from the principle of the mutual absence of any given *x* from the loci of all non-*x*. This could be formalised by means of joint presence and absence (*anvayavyatireka*) as a qualifier-qualified relation in which the predominant joint absence of all non-*x* from any given locus of *x* qualifies the latter as *x*. Induction presupposes, of course, *vyutpatti*, teaching the connection of any given word to the thing it denotes, which involves identification of the referent by ostentation accompanied by the use of the demonstrative pronoun “this,” as Dignāga explains at PSV V 50b–c.

**6.30** Dignāga conceived exclusion or preclusion as a generalized absence of all non-*x* from all *x*. Thus the inferential component of the theory is based on the principle that since no non-*x* is found in the locus of any *x* it is safe to conclude that the term used to denote *x* accomplishes this through joint absence (*vyatireka*). The connection established presupposes observing a knowledgeable person who teaches the denotation by pointing at the referent (if the referent is an observable entity) saying this is *x*, the use of the demonstrative pronoun ascertaining through co-reference (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) the linguistic validity of the reference. Since non-existence of other things in the referent is indivisible, non-existence does not entail the usual problems that attach to the theory of real universals. If they are singular real entities they become particulars when divided among the infinite number of individual referents. This problem, however, does not affect non-existence which being indivisible is adduced by Dignāga for defining the identity of things. If any *x* is not non-*x*, and non-*x* as already mentioned is not to be understood as anything but a term derived from the positive term for the purpose of denoting things that are not *x*, it becomes easy to understand why Dignāga thought it would be possible to interpret any

statement like the referent (*artha*) of the word "tree" as not a "non-tree" to one implicating the non-existence of non-trees at any tree.

**6.31** It is not clear how Dignāga understood the qualifying function of non-existence as it is nothing but an absence. However, it is an absence of something from something else: non-trees are absent from trees. Dignāga apparently thought that this would define trees in general and that this universally applicable observation would qualify as a substitute for real general properties and thus constitute the ground of application of words. Thus, in the final analysis the inferential component of the theory concerns the possibility of establishing an inferential canon that involves non-existence as a premise: the use of the word "tree" leads to the inference: it is a tree because it is not a non-tree. The inference, however, is about things and exclusion is exclusion of other referents or other speech units, not denotation or representation.

